Motivating Support for Women's Movements: Identity and Appeals

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Abstract

Social movements serve as powerful mechanisms for civic engagement and political change, yet mobilizing broad and sustained participation presents strategic challenges. Grassroots movement leaders regularly decide how to frame their appeals in contexts where intersecting identities shape grievances and microtargeting is difficult. They report a choice between encompassing appeals that speak to all members of their coalition or more specific identity-based appeals that target subgroups thereof. Using a study of Chile's contemporary women's movement against gender violence, I challenge findings —primarily from the US— that suggest that specific identity-based appeals turn off some potential supporters. While interviews with activists and analyses of social media posts by women's organizations reveal a preference for encompassing appeals, two survey experiments (N = 1,329 and N= 1,145) indicate that intersectional appeals targeting poor or Indigenous women enhance engagement among women from marginalized groups without sacrificing engagement from broader audiences. I attribute these findings to high levels of gender linked fate which, I argue, stems from the movement's (successful) efforts to cultivate solidarity across identity divides. These findings highlight how movement framing strategies interact with social identity dynamics to shape mobilization. By illustrating that intersectional appeals can foster coalition-building rather than fragmentation, this paper suggests that in contexts with similarly high collective identity, social movements need not shy away from specific appeals to subgroups with the strongest grievances.

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1 Introduction

Social movements are mechanisms for civic engagement and political transformation, enabling groups of citizens to collectively address grievances and advocate for change. In that pursuit, activists play a central role in framing the movement, defining goals, and motivating others to support their cause and join mobilization (Opp 2009; Benford and Snow 2000; Flacks 2004). Evidence shows that movements have better chances of being successful in achieving their goals when they are a massive, nonviolent resistance (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011) and inclusive (Weldon 2006, Gago 2020). Therefore, movement leaders often strive to build a large and diverse support base by crafting appeals that highlight grievances, inspire mobilization, and call for action.

Activists often seek to garner support in contexts in which potential participants are divided along identities in various dimensions. Even when activists address a grievance shared by a significant social group, differences in how the issue affects individuals —as well as their willingness to participate— are shaped by intersecting identities that create subgroups within the larger collective (Strolovitch 2006; Tormos 2017). First discussed among Black feminists in the United States (Hooks 1982; Crenshaw 1989), intersectionality is a framework that sheds light on how the overlapping identities of individuals in society determine the groups they favor (Shayo 2009; Walsh 2012; Harnois 2015; Atkin, Colson-Sihra, and Shayo 2021) and how others see them (McConnaughy and White 2011). Moreover, social identity theory suggests that the existence of these identity subgroups can lead to potential conflicts, distrust, and hierarchies between people even if they share the same identity in one dimension, representing a challenge to the inclusivity of social movements if their framing primes those forms of animosity (Tajfel 1970; Kalin and Sambanis 2018; Stets and Burke 2000).

Given these challenges, how do movement leaders navigate intersectional identity divides to mobilize participation? Can they address the specific needs of vulnerable members while still motivating ample mobilization and inclusivity? Activists can choose between two strategic appeal types: a broad, encompassing identity frame or a specific, intersectional identity approach. Broad appeals aim to include everybody in their call to attract widespread support and face less opposition, but they risk overlooking urgent grievances and disengaging vulnerable members of the larger group. As Strolovitch (2006) found for the case of advocacy groups in the US, organizations have sincere desires to represent disadvantaged members whose intersectional marginalized identities put them at a 'double jeopardy' or 'double bind' (Cassese, Barnes, and Branton 2015) but tend to downplay their specific issues as narrow while they frame issues affecting advantaged members as if they affect a majority. In contrast, specific identity appeals may better engage marginalized subgroups but risk alienating influential allies (Manekin, Mitts, and Zeira 2024) if the movement appears too niche, omits them as potential victims, or leads to friction toward the targeted group.

Many contemporary grassroots movements are characterized by low hierarchy[1] where alternative framings put forward by different subgroups compete (Bonilla and Tillery 2020; Benford and Snow 2000). In addition, in these movements, activists face resource constraints and limited ability to locate potential participants to

[1]These movements have activists or leaders who work and make decisions together, but are not organized around one or few clear heads holding most power.

individually target their appeal efforts. Therefore, leaders of these movements take advantage of public spaces and social media to spread their appeals without the opportunity to discriminate who is targeted by which one. Even if they combine framings and put out appeals targeting various identities, they do so knowing that most potential participants may see and react to them, creating potential mistargeting (Hernandez, Ottone, and Kalla 2025).

Existing research, primarily from the US, suggests that focusing on intersectional identities can have downsides, as specific appeals can trigger disengagement from advantaged groups. In similar studies with experimental tests, Bonilla and Tillery (2020) identify that black respondents, especially men and straight, support the Black Lives Matter movement more when they receive appeals related to systemic discrimination of black people in general, compared to appeals about discrimination against specifically black women or black members of the LGBTQ+ community. Manekin and Mitts (2022) find that in Israel and the US, nonviolent resistance is perceived as more violent and in need of policing –therefore less inviting– when participants are portrayed as ethnic minorities rather than as members of the majority. In the case of women's rights, Cassese et al. (2015) find that among potential supporters of a gender pay equity policy (moderates and liberals), appeals addressing the pay gap for ethnic minority women result in less support for the policy than appeals addressing the pay gap for all women among people with higher racial resentment and sexism. Similarly, Perez Brower (2022) claims that highly educated white women in the U.S. disengage their support for gendered policy agendas when the target of policies misaligns with their class (poor), and even more when it misaligns with their race (black). Conventional wisdom among activists is consistent with this evidence; activists often believe that intersectional appeals can lead to internal conflicts and are met with resistance (Laperrière and Lépinard 2016).

Yet, although existing evidence, drawn largely from the U.S., suggests a tradeoff between broad and intersectional appeals, there are reasons to think this tradeoff would not be universal. Specific appeals should turn off the support of other subgroups only if those other subgroups have not incorporated others' wellbeing into their own sense of wellbeing and self-esteem (Stets and Burke 2000). Under conditions where groups have come broadly into psychological solidarity within one another, perhaps through efforts of social movement organizers to create a deep sense of common identity and linked fate, we should not expect target appeals to have downsides for mobilization (Crowder 2022). To explore this possibility, I focus on a contemporary women's movement in Chile. My results challenge previous evidence and suggest the need for studying under which conditions this tradeoff emerges and how activists can build a movement in which intersectional appeals foster coalition building rather than disengagement.

Through interviews with activists and descriptive data from an original dataset of their social media appeals and engagement, I find that Chilean activists share the conventional wisdom coming from previous research. They express a commitment to intersectionality in theory and have made efforts to incorporate it into the movement over time, but they also believe that encompassing, non-targeted appeals are the more viable strategy for building a social movement and tend consistently to favor those encompassing appeals. However, activists are not able to observe the counterfactual of participants' responses to targeted appeals. The evidence presented in this paper can hopefully deepen our understanding of whether there are conditions under which

targeted appeals may not have stark downsides for movement mobilization.

In two online survey experiments with Chilean women (N=1,329 and N=1,145), I test the effects of exposure to real statistics and visual appeals from a movement against gender violence —either broadly framed or highlighting poor or Indigenous women. Compared to a pure control group, all forms of appeals significantly increase support and interest in participation. Notably, among vulnerable women, specific intersectional appeals lead to a (sometimes statistically significantly) increase in engagement, and less vulnerable women do *not* disengage when exposed to appeals targeting identities they do not share. I argue that this pattern is driven by high levels of gender linked fate in this case –that is, a woman's perception that her well-being is interconnected to the outcomes of their gender, fostered by the Chilean movement's efforts to cultivate collective identity and solidarity, particularly among less vulnerable women.

These findings challenge the prevailing assumption that intersectional appeals inevitably alienate advantaged supporters and demonstrate that, under certain conditions, they can enhance engagement of the targeted members without triggering disengagement from mis-targeted ones. Previous experimental evidence had mostly focused on the attitudes of the advantaged members of the broad identity toward the most vulnerable members by only including respondents from the advantaged subgroup (McConnaughy and White 2011; Cassese, Barnes, and Branton 2015; Crowder 2021; Perez Brower 2022) or by having limited intersectional group members in their sample (Bonilla and Tillery 2020) to fully explore their reactions. My findings give insight into the engaging effect of broad versus intersectional appeals for both advantaged and disadvantaged members of society, with evidence from a different context that can shed light on the conditions under which the disengagement of advantaged subgroups fades. This provides a more nuanced view of identity appeals' total effect in society and underscores its complex dynamic.

By highlighting the role of gendered linked fate and the movement's efforts to build solidarity across identity divides, this study provides new insights into how activists can navigate the tradeoffs between broad and specific appeals. More broadly, this research contributes to scholarship on social movements and intersectionality by suggesting that, rather than a fixed dilemma, the effectiveness of framing strategies may depend on context. Understanding when and how intersectional appeals foster coalition-building rather than division is a fruitful path for continued research.

2 Social Movement Participation: Leaders' Role and Identity Considerations

Movement Structure and Leaders' Framing Role

A defining trait of social movements is their collaborative nature, a collective effort toward a shared goal. However, while participants unite under a common cause, they engage with the movement in varying ways.

Participants generally fall into two main groups: **leaders** –also referred to as organizers or activists– and the **masses**. Regarding the leaders, Flacks (2004) describes their role saying that "At the core are those who helped initiate the movement in the first place or who stay engaged even in 'doldrums' times, who spark renewal after periods of relative decline, and whose daily lives and identities are deeply and, sometimes, totally embedded in the movement" (p. 142). Leaders' commitment shapes their role as architects of the movement's direction and growth, making their high level of engagement essential (Opp 2009). However, leaders alone are often insufficient to amplify the movement's visibility and propel its agenda forward. They need the participation and resources of the masses –citizens who sympathize with the movement's grievances and, at times, support it through mobilization, such as attending demonstrations.

While societal grievances can inspire a movement, their existence alone does not guarantee one will emerge. Leaders play a vital role in discerning and framing these issues, bringing them to the forefront of public discourse. By defining the problem clearly and framing it in a way that resonates with relevant social issues and affected groups, leaders help construct a narrative that draws attention and support. As part of this process, they may strategically adopt symbols, slogans, or practices to foster a collective identity (Polletta and Jasper 2001; Opp 2009). This framing shapes the movement's rhetoric and purpose, which can vary widely depending on the context. As Polletta and Jasper (2001) put it, "When successful, frames make a compelling case for 'injustice' of the condition and the likely effectiveness of collective 'agency' in changing that condition." (p. 291). Moreover, leaders offer a clear form of action for the masses to engage with and serve a role in coordinating mobilization, evaluating which forms of action are more strategic to overcome collective action problems and gauging the impact they will have on authorities.

Regardless of the specific dimensions leaders focus on, framing is critical for building a powerful movement. In Benford and Snow's (2000) words: "Frames are developed to achieve a specific purpose –to recruit new members, to mobilize adherents, to acquire resources, and so forth" (p. 624). Therefore, activists' framing decisions directly influence the masses' reaction to the movement and *framing alignment*, that is, congruency between individual beliefs or interests and movement goals or activities is a necessary condition for participation (Snow et al. 1986). In addition, depending on the specific grievances and goals of the movement, activists can target specific societal groups whose identities and experiences align more closely with the movement's goals. Their intention may not be to exclude citizens outside of the targeted group but to prioritize the participation of the ones activists think can relate and commit the most or be more persuasive in the eyes of their audience (i.e., relevant authority).

Identity: Motivation and Intersectionality

In this project, I examine how leaders' framing choices interact with the identities of the masses. A key motivator for participation is a strong sense of collective identity and investment in the grievance. Studies on redistribution, ethnic and racial politics (Larson and Lewis 2017; Habyarimana et al. 2007), and class solidarity (Haggard, Kaufman, and Long 2013; Corstange 2013) document a general trend of in-group favoritism. Similarly, frames

grounded in a common identity can elevate concern for the issue and incentivize participation (Snow et al. 1986; Jasper 2014; Aytaç and Stokes 2019). According to social identity theory, people's self-concept relates to their membership in groups of society defined by their similarities, that is, a shared attribute (Kalin and Sambanis 2018). And the sole perception of belonging is enough for in-group favoritism or discrimination of out-groups (Tajfel 1970; Stets and Burke 2000) because the individual's self-esteem is connected to the well-being of the group, even absent a material benefit. These identities can be activated to motivate cooperation and solidarity when made salient, which is what activists do when using movement appeals (Turner 2010). Individuals gain utility when their actions or opinions conform to the group's social norms, and the group's position in society is advanced. Therefore, identity appeals would lead to the psychological well-being of potential participants being more likely to rise and fall with helping the movement. Also, moral outrage and feeling personally affected by the grievances of the group lead individuals to engage in costly actions, such as participating in a social movement (Jasper 2014; Turner 2020; Fisher and Rouse 2022). So I expect appeals to generally increase support for the movements and mobilization attitudes.

Yet, individuals identify with multiple groups across various dimensions, and the strength of their response to a movement appeal will depend on how strongly they identify with the targeted group (Shayo 2009; Walsh 2012; Atkin, Colson-Sihra, and Shayo 2021) considering their relative ordering or "hierarchy of inclusiveness" (Stets and Burke 2000, p.231). If identifying with a subgroup within a broader identity responds to enhanced awareness of similarity with that subgroup and more political consciousness toward it (Harnois 2015), appeals that resonate across intersecting identities are likely to be particularly motivating, especially if their grievances in society relate not only to the general identity but also to the specific one. In the context of women's movements, for instance, the mobilizing effect of appeals will depend on how strongly women identify with both gender and other intersecting identities like class, race, ethnicity, or occupation.

However, while any woman who feels a strong gender identity and predisposition toward group solidarity might support movements addressing women's issues, framing appeals around a specific subgroup within that gender can weaken support if it shifts focus from the shared identity to a narrower one. When a movement introduces an additional identity dimension, it can inadvertently alienate those who don't share that specific intersectional identity, even if gender is still central to the framing. Bell Hooks captured this challenge in the context of U.S. feminist movements, noting that "The process begins with the individual woman's acceptance that American women, without exception, are socialized to be racist, classist and sexist, in varying degrees, and that labeling ourselves feminists does not change the fact that we must consciously work to rid ourselves of the legacy of negative socialization" (Hooks 1982). The situation she describes is a particularly difficult one to promote mobilization through appeals targeting subgroups because racism and classism describe prejudice and animosity against the out-group at the intersection, but disengagement could arise even without those feelings if less vulnerable women are somehow indifferent about the issues of intersectional subgroups or don't feel compelled to express support for them. Moreover, if members of the general identity feel a stronger attachment to an alternate dimension that is left out –or even contradicted– by the specific appeal, they may not only disengage but actively oppose a movement they would otherwise have supported. This backlash effect

is central to the dynamics explored in this project because existing research with evidence from the global north (Cassese, Barnes and Branton 2015; Bonilla and Tillery 2020; Manekin and Mitts 2022) and conventional wisdom among those activists (Tillery 2019; Laperrière and Lépinard 2016) argues that intersectional appeals targeting influential members of the group that do not share the specific identity disengage them compared to broad appeals.

Conversely, those who share the intersectional identity targeted by a specific appeal may feel a heightened sense of solidarity, perceiving their group as closer-knit. This stronger identification in both dimensions –such as gender and race– can elevate their perceived alignment with the movement in terms of its values and goals (Snow et al. 1986). For women who feel moderate gender identification and/or solidarity, an appeal addressing two dimensions they identify with could get them over their personal threshold for support and lead them to engage in a movement that would otherwise lack sufficient draw for them. This could also be the case if, for women experiencing a 'double bind', a broad movement is perceived as dominantly coded (Strolovitch 2006) because it overlooks their particularly severe experiences of violence. However, this increased engagement of some subgroups may come at the expense of others who, if they do not identify with a vulnerable group, could be especially influential or possess resources that the movement might benefit from.

Consequently, I define two alternative hypotheses. The first one[2] is consistent with the tradeoff documented in the literature and with a general context of in-group favoritism. But I argue this trend may not be universal and will depend on the strength of the social (or collective) identity with the encompassing group (gender in this study), and how offsetting or competing the not-shared intersectional identity is to the individual:

- First hypothesis (H1): Compared to appeals for women in general, specific appeals will increase support and participation at higher rates among women who share that specific identity, and at lower rates for women not sharing it.
- Second hypothesis (H2): In a context of strong collective identity and intersectional solidarity, specific appeals can increase support and participation at higher rates among women who share that specific identity without reducing the engagement of women who do not belong to that subgroup.

As I explain in the following two sections, the empirical evidence of this study comes from a case in which the national context and deliberate efforts from the movement have nurtured a strong level of collective identity and gender solidarity. Therefore, I favor H2. Alternatively, results consistent with the expectations of H1 would further support previous research from the US context and indicate that, despite movement efforts, mistargeting subgroups leads to disengagement.

To evaluate the level of collective identity, I use the concept of linked fate, that is, the idea that one's well-being is tied to the well-being of the group, so lifting one or some members of the group helps lift all of them. Although it has been mostly studied for different racial groups in the US (Sanchez and Vargas 2016; McClain et al. 2009; Pérez, Vicuña, and Ramos 2024), there are interesting explorations into the extent to which linked

[2]Pre-registered in the pre-analysis plan with some minor wording variations.

fate also plays a role in gender cohesion and the actions of women. While it is the case that gendered linked fate can be mediated by the salience of other intersectional identities such as race and marital status (Brown 2014; Ruppanner et al. 2019), there is evidence that when women in general are hit by a problem in a shared manner, their linked fate as a group increases (Stout, Kretschmer, and Ruppanner 2022). Similarly, a previous empirical study focused on the #MeToo movement found that women who express gendered linked fate also report higher motivation to join the movement (Jenkins, Poloni-Staudinger, and Strachan 2021). Therefore:

- Third hypothesis (H3): Women who express higher levels of gender linked fate will be more supportive and participative in the movement regardless of whether they receive an encompassing or specific appeal.

Importantly, expressing solidarity with other women and feeling interconnected with that gender group because of a shared identity is a baseline factor to support women's issues. Whether support for a women's movement that centers a vulnerable subgroup will persist among women who do not share that identity, will depend on what some scholars have coined as intersectional solidarity (Tormos 2017; Crowder 2022). Importantly, these authors have argued that the construction of intersectional solidarity is possible through a process of socialization, such as mobilization, because "people are not born into intersectional consciousness and it does not develop absent of political engagement" (Crowder 2022). Therefore, gender linked fate can be cultivated by the movement.

3 Context and Case Study

Violence against women (VAW) is a pervasive risk for girls and women worldwide, affecting all countries, races, religions, and income levels. Global estimates indicate that one in three women experiences physical or sexual violence in her lifetime, and every eleven minutes, a woman is killed in her own home[3]. However, less than 40% of VAW survivors seek help, and of these, fewer than 10% report incidents to the police[4]. Although VAW is a universal issue, it manifests differently across communities, and disproportionately impacts women with more vulnerable intersectional identities.

The issue is particularly severe in Latin America, a region marked by high rates of femicide, forced disappearances of women, and sexual harassment in both workplaces and public spaces. Despite the entrenched "machista" culture, the past decade has seen unprecedented social movements protesting gender violence, inequality, and demanding bodily autonomy. Since 2015, the "Ni Una Menos" movement –meaning "Not One Woman Less" in Spanish– has mobilized millions across Latin American streets and social media, even preceding the global "Me Too" movement. Women regularly protest in the region on International Women's Day (March 8) and the International Day for the Elimination of Violence Against Women (November 25). Although these movements have raised critical issues in public discourse and pressured for policy change, they have not gained the same traction or focus across all parts of the region.

[3]World Health Organization (2021). This rate does not consider sexual harassment.
[4]United Nations (2015)

Political science literature has consistently shown that women's movements advance women's societal position through various channels. For example, women's marches and local activism enhance female political participation and representation (Larreboure and González 2021; Moresi 2022), encourage reporting of sexual violence (Levy and Mattsson 2022), and significantly influence legislation to address VAW (Htun and Weldon 2012; Beer 2017). Additionally, the growth of women's networks and their capacity for collective action help close political gender gaps (Prillaman 2021). Given these benefits, it is notable that, despite their potential to combat violence and increase protection, women and male allies across Latin America do not uniformly mobilize on a large, inclusive scale. In some cases, these movements even face backlash and criticism from women themselves, underscoring the importance of understanding the factors shaping these diverse attitudes.

3.1 Case Study - Chile: Class segregation, Indigenous rights, and local movement

Chile is a high-income South American country with a stable democracy. In terms of violence against women, official estimates suggest trends in Chile align with those across the region, though femicide rates are slightly lower[5]. Despite government efforts and growing awareness, femicide rates have remained steady since 2010. Moreover, attempted femicides have increased since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic,[6] a phenomenon observed globally due to sudden changes in family and work dynamics.

The country has significant levels of income inequality and class segregation, and it is usually described as a classist society that discriminates based on socioeconomic level, making class the main identity cleavage in the country. Given this, the encompassing identity in this study is gender –more specifically, identifying as a woman. The central specific identity is socioeconomic class, which, described in an inter-sectional manner, refers to poor versus non-poor women. In terms of ethnicity, the country isn't highly racially diverse, with the vast majority of Chileans identifying as mestizo or white[7]. However, about 13% of the population is Indigenous. Historically, Indigenous communities have been marginalized and impoverished, experiencing racism, land dispossession, and a lack of norms ensuring political participation and representation. Indigenous rights have become a significant and contested issue in Chile in recent years; therefore, the second specific identity in this study is Indigenous women.

The current women's movement in the country was primarily born a decade ago during the Latin American dissemination of the "Ni Una Menos" movement that emerged in Argentina in 2015 as a response to the gruesome femicide of a teenage girl and that grew stronger across the region in October of 2016 with the news of another horrific case. In May of 2018 in light of complaints for various cases of sexual abuse and harassment of female students in universities, the movement took a turn and started more serious forms of protests by occupying several campuses all over the country. Although primarily led by college students, the *Feminist*

[5]CEPAL: In 2021, while eleven countries in the region had femicide rates of at least one per 100,000 women and five had rates between 0.7 and 0.8, Chile reported a rate of 0.5.

[6]Chilean Government, Sub-Commission on Gender Statistics

[7]Both groups are culturally homogeneous, with socioeconomic differences being the primary source of divisions.

May became an inclusive and widespread women's mobilization. Then, in mid October 2019 and by protesting an increase in the subway fare, unexpectedly the Chilean society erupted into the *Social Outburst* –a series of multitudinous protests, riots and strikes fighting the economic and political status quo and raising many demands in most dimensions of modern life. Although this outbreak wasn't exclusively a feminist protest, the women's movement played an important role in coordinating efforts and putting forward feminist demands to accompany the demands of all the other movements and causes fighting for several months.

The last big demonstration of that cycle of protest was the feminist march on International Women's Day of 2020 –the biggest in the Chilean feminist movement's history. The unrest only calmed down because of the arrival of the COVID pandemic and the agreement to start a participatory constitutional process in which social movements could compete to select representatives. The constitutional draft redacted was extremely progressive regarding gender equality and Indigenous rights. The draft was rejected on a referendum on September 2022. Since then, feminist activists have continued working and taken advantage of their coordination capacities and reputation among society to organize some demonstrations and push for particular policy goals, but the effervescence of the periods before that rejection has declined and the movement is in a regrouping process.

Figure 1: Timeline of Chilean Movement and Significant Events



Time intervals identified from t_1 to t_5 represent local movement periods, delimited by significant events
Color choices are purely aesthetic

In less than a decade, the movement has dramatically increased its popularity and support, summoning higher numbers of protesters over time and taking on a central position of influence in policies and public opinion. Figure 1 presents a simple timeline of the movement that locates the above mentioned milestones. Each of the events that initiates a new period from t_1 to t_4 corresponds to a massive demonstration representing the accumulation of support and communication of their messages to motivate further mobilization. The last event (rejection of Constitution) is an electoral defeat for the movement, which could lead to a period t_5 of higher difficulties to motivate support and participation. But according to my argument, if the movement had already permeated the public opinion with their frames and goals, and if the previous successes had served to increase gendered linked fate, movement leaders may still be able to engage the masses at this period. In the next section, I provide descriptive evidence of the real appeals the movement has used over every period (t_1 to t_5), and in the experimental portion, it is important to notice that the results correspond to data collected exclusively in period t_5 (after rejection of the Constitution).

Survey data from the 2020 8M march in Chile (Gonzalez and Vidal 2020) shows that participants were overwhelmingly cis women (95%), heterosexual (79%), and feminist-identifying (93%). They were mostly young adults (18–45), highly educated (over 70% with college or graduate degrees), and concentrated in the middle and upper classes, with three-quarters employed. This profile suggests that the women mobilizing were not necessarily the most vulnerable.

Thus, Chile provides a valuable case for studying contemporary women's movements, as it shares with the rest of Latin America both the pervasive issue of gender violence and the intersectional identities of socioeconomic class and ethnicity. Moreover, the sustained efforts of movement leaders in recent years allow for an analysis of the identity appeals used and their perspectives on their role. This also provides an opportunity to test the theoretical expectations in a period of decreased movement activity, following a concerted effort to foster gendered collective identity and solidarity.

4 What Movement Leaders Believe About Appeals

How do leaders think about their framing strategies vis-a-vis identity appeals, and what have they actually done in that respect? In this section, I present descriptive evidence documenting the real appeals that the most popular organizations within the movement have used over time, the feedback they perceive from their audiences, and some illustrative qualitative evidence from interviews conducted with movement leaders[8].

Focus on common grievance

The contemporary women's movement has clearly centered VAW as the main grievance to mobilize for and the way it relegates women to a disadvantaged position in society, highlighting how prevalent it is, the many different forms this violence takes depending on the context, the universality of the threat across social divides, and how women rely on the support of other women to overcome the problem because of distrust in the system to do so. In the movement leaders' words: "This cycle of mobilizations has been characterized by centering the problem of violence against women" (Activist 5, author interview August 2024).

This framing responds to leaders' discussions to unite in a common goal despite particular preferences for other issues and the decision to focus on a general call first. As one of the activists who joined the movement during the first period puts it: "In 2016 I participated in the organization of the 8M event and up to that moment, I hadn't realized there were so many groups working on different issues, such as feminists fighting obstetric violence[9], other making their main priority violence against women, others with abortion, others with non-sexist education" (Activist 2, author interview July 2024). Similarly, when talking about how in internal discussions activists evaluated the focus of their appeals, one leader who has been working in the feminist

[8] All interviews were conducted in Spanish, the translations are mine.

[9] When mentioning "obstetric violence", the activists refers to mistreatment of women during pregnancy and childbirth, mainly by the healthcare system.

movement since before "Ni Una Menos" mentioned: "I've seen discussions of some feminist organizations saying that feminism can't be of the masses because the ones out here are always the same, so we should work on strengthening ourselves. [..] And I've also seen another of the big organizations saying that it has to be of the masses because it has to appeal to (all) the women and gender-non-conforming people because we are all (women) workers" (Activist 1, author interview July 2024). Later she added: "But the needs of the reality impose themselves very fast. [...] You need a mobilization in which what you say makes sense to women because you are talking about gender oppression and not your particular problem" (Activist 1, author interview July 2024).

This preference for a grievance that resonates with most women through an encompassing appeal is also reflected in the actual materials the movement has used. In the Chilean movement in the past decade, two main organizations have led the communication between activists and the masses, and defined the framing: The Chilean Network Against Violence Against Women (Red), and the 8M Feminist Coordinator (CF8M). Since 2007, the Red has launched yearly campaigns in which they release a series of yellow and black posters with the main messages they are using in their mobilizations. They distribute and paste physical posters across the country and post them in all their media presence (website, social media). In 18 years, they have released 115 posters with the most important stating: "Be careful! Machismo kills". I manually coded all posters to differentiate between messages appealing to all women in general, such as "All women against all forms of violence", versus the ones that have an explicit specific identity appeal, such as "Lesbian, so what?!". All posters could be classified into one of the two groups because I consider general messages that do not mention a specific identity as targeting women in general. I also code messages referring to women of different ages (i.e girls) or to women in their role of mothers as part of the broad identity because that is how the local movement has referred to them. Figure 2 shows the yearly share of posters in each category, highlighting a clear preference for broad appeals and how specific ones have been a more sporadic and recent trend. While in most years none of the posters have centered or mentioned a specific identity, six times the organization has included those identities in at least one of them. 2017 was the only year in which they included two posters targeting specific identities, one focused on migrant women[10] and another on lesbians.

The CF8M is the most known organization in the movement and represents the joint effort between several smaller organizations. They communicate with the rest of society through social media, mainly Instagram, where more than 230 thousand people follow their public profile as of October 2024. They have been active on the platform with more than 3600 posts since they created it in 2018. The use of Instagram gives them a unique feature of communication in which they not only put information out but also receive some feedback on people's reactions to each of their posts through comments and *"likes"*. I created an original dataset of those posts up to September 2024 and manually coded the type of appeal they use. First, I excluded from the sample any posts that were videos because they mostly correspond to blurry recordings of protests or marches and provide more complex information that requires engaged attention from audiences and are hard to evaluate

[10]One of the activists from this organization that I interviewed said that the particular poster they released that year about migrant women had been a mistake because it says "We are all migrants", which they later realized is not true and wasn't an effective message. Therefore, they avoid using it.

Figure 2: Distribution of posters per identity in each year - Red organization



as a clear message. Most posts in the sample are single images and accompanied by text, but in the case of "*carousel*" posts with various photos, I only consider the first one for the classification. This defines a sample of 2938 valid posts, which I first evaluate to determine whether they meet a broad classification as appeals or not. If both the visual and textual elements of the post are clear, then I keep the observation in the sample. The non-appeal posts are mainly unclear images with no explanation or blurry photos, and they were mostly posted in the initial years of the Instagram account. Using a random sample of 1053 posts, out of which 1006 are considered appeals, I code whether the appeal is explicitly centering an intersectional appeal (specific) or not (encompassing) using the same criteria as above. Appeals that do not clearly center an intersectional identity on dimensions such as class, ethnicity, race, migrant status, religion, disability, sexual orientation or gender identity are coded as encompassing. Posts that express solidarity to other movements not related to women's issues (very few in the sample) are coded as intersectional too. This method is conservative in the classification of posts as intersectional and could lead to bias in favor of the broad group to avoid marking as specific appeals that many viewers wouldn't consider as such. I cannot rule out that some posts can be perceived as targeting specific subgroups of women if they include cues that are only picked up by some people and not by me, but the appeals tend to be very explicit. I also coded the type of post in terms of action (call to protest, statement, meeting, informational) the leaders are inviting to because of the differential engagement each type can foster. Figure 3 presents the share of the posts with encompassing versus specific appeals in each of the periods of the movement in which the Instagram account was active, according to the timeline presented in Figure 1.

In line with the appeals of the Red, the vast majority of appeals used by the CF8M have a broad identity framing. But there's a suggestive trend of increasing use of specific appeals over time, reaching around 23% of the total number of posts in the latest period. I interpret this as reflecting a deeper process of diversification of appeals over time because of the accumulated experience of gender solidarity that allows activists to mobilize women with appeals not necessarily targeting them at all times. Through mobilization centered around the idea that VAW is a common threat to all women, the movement has actively worked on increasing gender linked fate and had the chance to communicate how that common threat also has nuances, making the problem more

Figure 3: Distribution of posts in each period according to movement timeline



serious for some women. As one of the leaders says: "I think there was a beautiful approach to learning and an incredible openness from the less vulnerable women. Also, because the concept of intersectionality was part of that movement, we educated ourselves about how gender inequalities are for someone who's also from African descent, or Indigenous, or poor, for instance" (Activist 3, author interview August 2024). Similarly, another activist recognizes that the movement has been able to modify gender norms and general perceptions of the masses: "We have lived a feminist revolution, in the sense that a revolution is a process that changes conditions permanently: The structures that organize our everyday life, the building of common sense, and a change in the base of the sensible and material dimensions of life" (Activist 5, author interview August 2024). One of the leaders of the Red organization described how she sees the the evolution of these appeals over time and how the accumulation of experiences in the process of mobilization led to the increased focus on intersectionality: "With our campaign *'Be careful! Machismo Kills*' that just released messages for the 18th year, we can see how our organization has been deepening into the varied manifestations of violence and becoming conscious of its different levels. Now it's not like at the beginning, when we would simply mention hitting, femicides or rape, but other forms. And this campaign is very helpful to see the process followed by the various groups that come together here. To observe how violence against women also relates to the economic system or a colonialist approach. With different areas beyond just being a women and period" (Activist 7, author interview August 2024).

Nonetheless, the movement is still focused mostly on general appeals. Why? Based on my interviews and observations, leaders genuinely want to build a movement that expresses intersectional solidarity, but also have the impression that broad appeals are more mobilizing because engaging people with appeals targeting a subgroup they do not share is difficult, in line with the evidence of previous research (Cassese, Barnes, and Branton 2015; Bonilla and Tillery 2020; Manekin and Mitts 2022). If we look at the real feedback activists receive on their posts on Instagram, encompassing identity posts on average have more likes than specific ones (see Figure 4), even after big demonstrations that increase the popularity of the movement. All analysis of the social media engagement is done with the log number of *likes* to reduce the influence of outliers, given that some posts reached unprecedented levels of virality. In all periods the mean of log likes is higher for encompassing (green) than specific (purple) appeals, but the gap shrank in the most recent period. Similarly, in Table 1, I report the estimations of a linear model that evaluates the association between the type of identity appeal at

Figure 4: Mean and 95% CI number of likes per movement period and identity appeal



Table 1: Effect of type of post on Instagram engagement over movement periods

	Log number of likes
(Intercept)	5.99***
	(0.08)
Specific	−0.55***
	(0.16)
t3	1.31***
	(0.10)
t4	0.82***
	(0.10)
t5	0.89***
	(0.12)
meeting	−0.72***
	(0.09)
protest	0.74***
	(0.10)
statement	0.72***
	(0.10)
t3*Specific	−0.15
	(0.30)
t4*Specific	0.02
	(0.22)
t5*Specific	0.13
	(0.25)
R^2	0.36
Adj. R^2	0.36
Num. obs.	1006
RMSE	1.10

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

each period (t_2 as reference) and the number of log likes, including fixed effects per type of action (informational as reference). Although specific appeals always have a significantly lower number of likes than encompassing ones, the size of that difference becomes slightly smaller in the last period t_5.

Activists recognize the challenge of getting some women to show up for others despite their efforts. One of the leaders of the college women's strikes of 2018 mentioned: "I tried to put together a working group with neighbors and women from other areas of society beyond only college women [...] because some of us were convinced that the mobilization couldn't be for female students only. [...] The problem existed beyond and we knew we had the privilege of being able to mobilize, while a housewife couldn't or it was much harder for working women. [...] But this wasn't the general view, for many mobilized female students the fight needed to remain at the university" (Activist 3, author interview August 2024). They are also critical of their own ability and efforts to build an intersectional movement that actively favors solidarity among women (Einwohner et al. 2021). One of the leaders of the CF8M organization described that challenge in the following way: "The feminist movement is very diverse and heterogeneous, but its public speakers are not as diverse or heterogeneous. [...] And I think that has to do with the opportunity structures within the movement. [...] But I do think there are exclusion frames with a racialized (ethnic) component in the ways feminism understands itself and its role as a political actor, in which our Indigenous sisters always appear as an otherness" (Activist 8, author interview August 2024). In other words, feminist activists are aware that building an intersectional movement requires not only advocating for social policies addressing multiple forms of vulnerability, but creating ties, building coalitions, and organizing inclusive decision-making (Tormos 2017). And even though they may consider that the movement could do better, the experience of mobilization in the last decade shows that they have been able

to create an inclusive movement. I interviewed an activist from the most important organization of Indigenous women in the country. When asked about internal power dynamics within the women's movement and whether they reflect the ones in society that relegate Indigenous people to a subordinate position, she said: "I think that even though they reproduce them, [...] it is much more flexible in women's movements". She then added: "In the power structures we are used to seeing in formal politics, it is much harder to generate empathy and inclusion. But in the feminist movement, or at least in the experience we have had in sharing activism, it happens. But it requires us to be very present; it isn't something that happens on its own" (Activist 9, author interview August 2024).

Movement leaders identify that including specific appeals is important in their goals to combat gender violence and protect women across society, so despite those challenges, they continue trying to do so. In the launching event for the 2024 campaign of the Red, one of the organization's presenter said: "Hopefully in the future we will include a message regarding the situation of incarcerated women in our campaign. We have tried several times but it hasn't worked" (Red activist speech, author recording August 2024). And despite the difficulty, the use of appeals focused on specific identities reflects small successes in making the movement more inclusive not only internally, but in its engagement with the masses. One of the activists reflected on how challenging it was to incorporate a discussion of intersectional marginalization per class when women's mobilizations inside the universities (2018) were mainly attended by upper-middle class students: "The forms of gender violence experienced between social classes are very different. [...] Being honest, it was hard to put this demand on the main list. It was hard to get the rest of the mobilized women to understand the extra layer of violence over violence that student-mothers were living inside the university" (Activist 3, author interview August 2024), but celebrates that those discussions were eye-opening to many women and led them to incorporate their particular demands to the authorities. This highlights the role that feminist mobilization has played in educating women, building consciousness, and creating a sense of collective identity that could foster solidarity. They have done this by focusing on a grievance that exists across social divides and highlighting how it is more severe for some women.

5 Experimental Strategy

Women's movement activists recognize that mobilizing participation through specific identity appeals is a complex task. Drawing on international examples that highlight the success of inclusive strategies (Weldon 2006) and their own struggles in agreeing on intersectional frames with other participants, they believe that cooperation among women is more likely when the movement's framing emphasizes shared aspects of their experiences. This aligns with existing research from the global north and with the perception that intersectionally vulnerable people can sometimes be considered '*non-prototypical*' by more advantaged members (Harnois 2015), or their issues as particularistic (Strolovitch 2006). As a result, activists favor general appeals. But the information they use to evaluate these appeals is incomplete, as they are only able to talk to women who are already participating in their mobilizations and the ones who self-select or are algorithmically targeted to see their social media posts.

Or they don't use targeted appeals in the same circumstances as encompassing ones, so they cannot observe what would happen in the counterfactual case of using a targeted appeal.

The difficulty to assess the true impact of their appeal frames on potential participants vis-a-vis their own agendas for the movement and the motivations and reactions others publicly state is not exclusive to this movement. In the case of the Black Lives Matter movement fighting for racial justice in the US, previous research illuminates a similar pattern. Tillery (2019) posits that one consensus within the literature on the movement is that activists tend to utilize intersectional framings based on gender, LGBTQ+ and racial identities, but content analysis of Twitter messages from various BLM accounts document that those appeals represent less than 20% of all messages. To check this discrepancy, Bonilla and Tillery (2020) conduct an experimental test of frames and see that intersectional ones disengage the less vulnerable members without increasing engagement from the targeted identities. After the killing of George Floyd in 2020, massive and diverse protests erupted across the country. Fisher and Rouse (2022) conducted a survey among a random sample of participants to identify their motivations to attend protests, and found that in addition to antiracist motivations, one-third of respondents expressed other intersectional motivations mainly aligned with their own identities. Similarly, various works relying on surveys of participants on Women's March in the US in 2017 and 2018 have found that between 18% and 42% of attendants express intersectional issues as a motivation to mobilize (Fisher, Dow and Ray 2017; Crowder and Smith 2020), and that intersectionality is more of a concern among participants of that movement compared to other not related to women's issues (Heaney 2021). But we can't know whether it was the intersectionality that led those participants to protest in the first place, and what reasons led non-protesters to stay home. Thus, the accounts from activists and participants do not provide a full picture, and an experimental evaluation is the most internally valid method to check the effect of different identity appeals on the masses.

This study relies on two survey experiments conducted online to secure comparable forms of treatment with a simple and scalable design where the particular identity appeal can be manipulated while keeping other aspects of the movement and its framing constant. The participants were recruited through Facebook ads with a message inviting them to participate in an academic research in which they could express their opinions about the social and political climate in the country (see a screenshot of one of the ads in the Appendix). The recruitment ad also indicated that participation would be rewarded by including them in a raffle for prices of $40,000 Chilean pesos (around US$50), which represented roughly 10% of the monthly minimum wage at the time. In case they decided to participate, they were redirected to a 10-minute anonymous survey in Qualtrics. The first wave of the experiment was conducted in December 2022, and the second in January 2024.

In an effort to avoid priming the participants as to what the experiment was about, the recruitment did not mention that the study was targeting adult women, nor that it was going to ask them about violence against women or women's movements in particular. Before the random treatment assignment, the participants were asked some general demographic characteristic questions and their opinion about several problems and situations in society. Based on their demographic characteristics, the experimental samples aren't nationally representative. Compared to estimations and data from the National Institute of Statistics, my sample in both

Table 2: Comparison of characteristics - Chilean women (population) vs experimental samples

	Location		Education			Class/Ethnicity	
	Capital	Urban	<HS	HS	College	Poverty	Indigenous
Population	40.1%	87.8%	30.6%	42.0%	26.7%	16.8%	12.7%
First wave	48.0%	86.0%	12.0%	51.4%	36.6%	24.9%	13.0%
Second wave	45.9%	85.5%	10.7%	45.9%	43.5%	21.1%	12.0%

	Age group							
	<25	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	65-74	75-84	> 84
Population	8.6%	19.9%	18.7%	16.7%	16.1%	11.2%	6.2%	2.5%
First wave	7.4%	10.4%	11.1%	25.3%	30.4%	13.9%	1.4%	0.2%
Second wave	5.0%	10.0%	12.0%	19.4%	29.8%	19.5%	4.2%	0.3%

waves is slightly older and more educated, it over-samples the capital region, and more women identify as part of the lower socioeconomic class –poor. See table 2 and further information in the Appendix for more details.

It is worth mentioning that the socioeconomic self-identification question did not provide exact income levels to define each group because the goal was to obtain the identification according to their own social perceptions. Still, in a separate data collection recruited in the same way to test my experimental materials, I included an extra question on the income level of the household with monetary ranges and found a very strong positive correlation with the socioeconomic self-identification measure that does not depend on ideology. Also, the socioeconomic self-identification question was worded to include the category *"lower class"* instead of *"poor"* to better reflect both the groups that are actually under the official poverty line (6.9% of women in 2022 and 11% in 2017) and people considered socioeconomically vulnerable in a broader sense (up to 30% depending on the method of calculation) because the distinction isn't always clear to citizens. Although the share of women self-identifying as low class in my samples (24.4% in the first wave and 21.1% in the second) is higher than the official 16.8% of women considered poor according to the multidimensional poverty line in 2022[11], it is closer to the 19.9% of 2017 and the perception may be influenced by the important economic struggles during the pandemic[12]. This convenience sample is a fair representation of the women I consider to be *the masses* activists are trying to motivate, as opposed to the activists themselves who are usually younger and more privileged. It also considers an appropriate share of poor and Indigenous women to be able to test the effect of shared specific identity appeals and a mostly representative distribution of women in terms of geographical location. The final convenience samples include 1,347 adult women for the first wave of the experiment and 1,145 for the second.

Design

The experiment replicates a movement appeal by communicating the problems that mobilize them and how they organize and act. That is, providing real information about the problem of violence against women for the particular identity they are focusing on, and a visual appeal that better defines the movement's characteristics, slogans, type of actions they are calling for, and what they fight for. For the Latin American case and especially

[11]Casen survey by the National Institute of Statistics.

[12]In addition, the government is currently evaluating a modification in the way the country measures poverty. A committee of experts recently completed a report with their proposal, which would have estimated the national poverty rate for the whole population in 2022 (men and women) at 22.3% instead of 6.5%.

the Ni Una Menos movement, those visual appeals have taken the form of posters shared virtually through social media and physically by sticking them on walls and lampposts on the streets.

Moreover, the treatment appeals vary according to the particular identity that is made salient: encompassing when talking about women, and specific when referring to poor women or Indigenous women. Although it is not possible to rule out that for some participants the information and poster might have been surprising and new, generating a process of updating perceptions, the treatments are designed to be mostly priming as they only convey real information that can be easily found online or in the news when these topics are being discussed. The informational portion of the appeals all begin with the same phrase regardless of identity: *"Going back to the problem of violence against women: Globally, 1 in 3 women is a victim of sexual or physical violence at some point in her life,"* and continues providing statistics and descriptions about how this problem affects the particular group or subgroup randomly assigned. Similarly, the posters (see Figure 5) were developed and tested to replicate the type of visual appeals the local movements use regularly. Given this, the treatment follows the efforts that activists do in problematizing real dynamics in society, making salient those grievances, and channeling them into collective action. These various dimensions in a leader's effort when trying to recruit supporters are all part of the appeal as a whole, that is, the strategy necessitates both the informational and call-for-action aspects that convey what the movement stands for in order to make a complete appeal.

Nonetheless, the information can be found elsewhere on its own, so in order to address any potential concerns regarding a treatment with two elements, in the first wave for each type of identity the participants were assigned to the treatment in two levels: Only informational or complete. This way, the analysis allows for evaluating whether presenting a realistic movement's appeal and framing has a significantly different impact than what the information and people's expectations of a related movement have on their attitudes and behavior. Results show that the differential effects generated by the purely informational versus complete treatments are indistinguishable from zero, so in the next section, I present results considering only the complete appeal treatments as they are the most accurate representation of the true appeals made by the movement[13]. This distinction wasn't used in the second wave of the experiment, in which all treated participants received the complete (info + visual) appeal. More discussion, results for the two-stage treatment, and results for an alternative estimation grouping both treatment levels for each identity are in the Appendix.

The visual appeals used for each identity treatment are in Figure 5 in their translated version. The original posters in Spanish and the informational paragraphs used in each appeal can be found in the Appendix too. All visual appeals include text describing the movement as feminist and what its goal is regarding the identity it targets, uses as consistent language as possible with phrases commonly used by the movement, the same general colors, and the same type of actions (i.e. protest, national strike, local activities). Yet, they do look different in the images used to describe each identity. I aimed to use drawings of prototypical women of each identity that do not prime or remind of any women in particular. Nonetheless, for the case of the poor

[13]I did not discuss in the pre-analysis plan for the first experiment that I may decide to focus only in the complete appeals for the main analysis, as I expected potentially statistically different effects between informational and complete appeals that would require further evaluation. Nonetheless, in the pre-analysis plan for the second experiment I pre-registered only using complete appeals as the distinction used in the first experiment proved not to be informative.

appeal, I used a real image of a woman to avoid offensive or cartoony drawings. In the case of the Indigenous appeal, there's more colors to accurately represent the traditional clothes of women of three different Indigenous groups in the country. And in the encompassing appeal, there's extra text to describe the goal of the movement further in case the participant isn't familiar with word "patriarchal" and to balance the amount of information compared to the other posters with more complex images. I cannot rule out that participants may consider one poster more or less aesthetically pleasing, and their responses could be influenced by that to some degree. But the design similarities in combination with explicit mention and visual cues of the identity in the visual appeal, plus the informational paragraph should clearly prime to a different identity focus over any other difference.

Figure 5: Posters for treatments:
Encompassing (left), specific poor (center), and specific Indigenous (right)

Each participant was randomly assigned to one of the identity appeals or a pure control group that received no information or visual appeal. As it can be seen in figure 6, in the first wave there was 5 treatment arms ($T0$ to $T4$) and in the second wave there were 4 ($T0$ to $T3$). As mentioned before, in the main text, I only consider complete appeals ($T3$ and $T4$) and control group ($T0$) for the analysis of first experiment, see the Appendix for the evaluation of all treatment arms.

Figure 6: Diagram of random treatment assignment per wave

(a) First Wave



(b) Second Wave



Outcome Variables

To evaluate how the movement appeals influence the intention and extent of support for the cause and willingness to participate in its various forms of action, the survey includes three post-treatment questions representing attitudes towards the movement at three levels of commitment and radicality. In the first wave of the experiment, I also tried a behavioral outcome using donations. This measure proved to be inappropriate for the context[14]. I kept that outcome out of the main analysis in this section, but more information regarding this variable can be found in the Appendix.

Self-reported attitudes in both waves:
(1) Support for the movement; (2) Likelihood of participating in any of the various forms of action or participation of the movement in the future; (3) Likelihood of attending the movement's next protest.

The three variables are on a 0-10 scale in which higher numbers represent more support or likelihood of participation in the movement. In the analysis of the second wave of the experiment, I aggregated the three attitudinal variables into one **mobilization index** that takes on values from zero to one.

Additionally, after the attitudinal questions, participants of the second wave were asked their opinion regarding "*who benefits from the movement?*" in a multiple-choice question in which they could select as many options as they wanted from the following list: (a) feminist activists, (b) the government, (c) women in general, (d) men, (e) girls, (f) vulnerable women, (g) political parties, (h) society, (i) myself, (j) society, (k) women victims of violence and their families. This question aims to understand how women think of the movement and their goals absent any appeals, and whether different types of identity appeals can modify that.

Gender Linked Fate

The second wave of the experiment includes two pre-treatment questions to measure the level of gender linked fate of respondents. The variable used for analysis is an index from 0 to 1 combining both questions where higher levels reflect more linked fate. Instead of classic forms of the linked fate survey questions (i.e. "*how much do you think that what happens to X group relates to what happens to your life?*") used mostly in the United States, the questions I used are context-specific and reflect agreement with statements referred to real and popular issues in the country. I also chose not to use the classic form of the question because it is not used in Chile, and because of its abstract nature, could be confusing to respondents. Instead, the questions used in this study provide concrete applications of a gender linked fate perception.

How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements (5-point scale):

- The increase in the rate of women going to college and holding positions of power in politics and businesses gives me hope for my own future.

[14]Donations to social movements are not a common practice in Chile. Including this question even raised suspicion about the transparency of the study among some respondents.

– The Government shouldn't make the implementation of the new law on parental responsibility and effective payment of alimony a priority because it only benefits some women in the country[15].

While the first statement primes a positive perceived connection to other women, the second one reverses the logic, following the technique in Lowery, Knowles, and Unzueta (2007). Furthermore, following the typology of Strolovitch (2006), an index combining both statements better reflects a general attitude of interconnectedness with the female gender as a whole and not one particular prototypical group that comes to mind in a more ambiguous linked fate question. More specifically, the first statement refers to an advantaged-subgroup issue, and the second one to a disadvantaged-subgroup issue (Strolovitch 2006, p.897). By using this measure of linked fate, I am deviating from the canonical approach that asks about group consciousness in a single dimension (e.g. just women or people of one race) and priming respondents to think about a myriad of women. Therefore, by design, my measure of gender linked fate involves –at least to some extent– a measure of intersectional solidarity (Crowder 2022).

Specification

Given the random assignment between treatments, I first estimate the average treatment effects (ATE) of each treatment versus the control group for my whole sample with the following simple specification for the first wave:

$$Y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 AppealEnc + \beta_2 AppealPoor + \theta \mathbf{X}_i + \epsilon_i$$

And for the second wave:

$$Y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 TEncompassing + \beta_2 TSpecificPoor + \beta_3 TSpecificIndigenous + \theta \mathbf{X}_i + \epsilon_i$$

Where for each observation i, Y is the relevant outcome, $\mathbf{X}$ is a vector of covariates that includes class and ethnic identification, that is, considers whether the respondent is a poor or Indigenous woman or not, and the level of gender linked fate. ϵ is an error term. The coefficients of interest are β_1, β_2, and sometimes β_3, depending on the experiment, and they would support the idea that appeals increasing the salience of identities and informing about the movement lead to mobilization attitudes if they are positive. More importantly, the difference between those betas will indicate whether encompassing versus specific appeals lead to variations in engagement.

Then, to explore the different reactions between subgroups and adjudicate between the alternatives hypotheses H1 and H2, I build on the same specifications, but add an interaction between each treatment term and identifying with each specific identity. Therefore, the specification for the first wave is:

$$Y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 AppealEnc + \beta_2 AppealPoor + \beta_3 Poor + \beta_4 AppealEnc * Poor + \beta_5 AppealPoor * Poor + \theta \mathbf{X}_i + \epsilon_i$$

[15] Very popular and widely known policy project at the time.

And for the second wave are[16]:

$$(a)Y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 TEncompassing + \beta_2 TSpecificPoor + \beta_3 TSpecificInd + \beta_4 Poor + \beta_5 TEncompassing * Poor + \beta_6 TSpecificPoor * Poor + \beta_7 TSpecificInd * Poor + \theta \mathbf{X}_i + \epsilon_i$$

$$(b)Y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 TEncompassing + \beta_2 TSpecificPoor + \beta_3 TSpecificInd + \beta_4 Indigenous + \beta_5 TEncompassing * Indigenous + \beta_6 TSpecificPoor * Indigenous + \beta_7 TSpecificInd * Indigenous + \theta \mathbf{X}_i + \epsilon_i$$

6 Experimental Results

Following the previous specifications, I evaluate the impact of all treatments on the three attitudinal outcomes: Support, participation, and likelihood of protest. And for the second wave I also evaluate the opinion on who benefits from the movement (reported in the Appendix). The figures presented below correspond to the estimated coefficients and confidence intervals at 95% for the specification that includes all covariates. In the Appendix, I show the results whithout covariates or only with imbalanced covariates (previous protest experience and having children) for the second wave of the experiment . Effects are mostly consistent across models. In the first wave of the experiment, the attrition after treatment assignment was around 28.3% but balanced across treatment groups, and in the second wave, it was only 2.1%, with the treatment group with the highest attrition at only 4%. Therefore, I am confident that the results presented below do not respond to differential opting out of the study by identity appeals[17]. I did not explicitly preregistered correcting the estimations for multiple comparison according to any methods, so the figures and tables in the article show the non-adjusted values. Nevertheless, for one of the power analyses, I used the –very punitive– Bonferroni correction. In the Appendix, I report the adjusted p-values of all estimations for the full samples using three different methods[18], and all p-values discussed in the text correspond to Bonferroni corrections.

6.1 First wave

This experiment included only one specific identity, poverty, because socioeconomic class is the main cleavage in Chile. As figure 7 shows, all forms of movement appeal increase the average level of support for the movement (control mean = 7.247), the interest in participating in it (control mean = 4.821), and the likelihood of attending the next protest (control mean = 4.319). These results are consistent with the idea that movement leaders do play a significant role in motivating other people to join their movements, and that identity appeals increase the salience of gender identity among women.

[16]These particular specifications were not explicitly pre-registered, as the document indicates that the second wave builds on the pre-analysis plan of the first wave, which only talks about the interaction between each treatment arm and identifying as poor, and whose estimating equation does not include the Indigenous treatment. Still, the specifications follow the same logic indicated in the pre-registered document: all treatment arms, plus interaction between each treatment term and a dummy variable representing the vulnerable identity.

[17]See appendix for a more extensive discussion on attrition.

[18]Bonferroni, Holm, and Benjamini & Hochberg methods.

Table 3: First wave mean value of outcomes (0-10) and s.d. per treatment status

	Control	Encompassing	Specific (poor)	Full Sample
Support	7.247 (2.84)	7.776 (2.88)	7.977 (2.51)	7.661 (2.77)
Participation	4.821 (3.35)	5.260 (3.44)	5.571 (3.26)	5.211 (3.36)
Protest	4.319 (3.43)	4.841 (3.61)	5.162 (3.40)	4.767 (3.49)

Figure 7: Effect of movement's appeals on support and participation among all women - First wave
Considering covariates, only for complete appeals (info + poster). Estimated coefficients and 95% CI.



More interestingly, and contrary to initial expectations and findings from other contexts (Hernandez, Ottone, and Kalla 2025; Cassese, Barnes, and Branton 2015; Manekin, Mitts, and Zeira 2024; Bonilla and Tillery 2020; Manekin and Mitts 2022), the increase in favorable attitudes toward the movement is at least as large for the specific identity appeal than for the general one, and always statistically significant at 95% confidence. Doing a Bonferroni correction for multiple hypothesis testing, I find that compared to the pure control group, encompassing appeals have a positive effect of 0.518 (p=0.046) on support, of 0.394 (p=0.238) on interest in participating, and of 0.495 (p=0.108) on likelihood to attend the next protest. For the case of specific appeals, the always positive and significant estimated effects are of 0.627 (p=0.003) for support, 0.606 (p=0.028) for participation, and 0.735 (p=0.006) for protesting, but it is worth noting that none of the differences in effects are statistically significant. Since this initial analysis aggregates all women —both those who identify as poor and those who do not— the results could reflect one of three possibilities: (1) all women are slightly more mobilized by the specific appeal, (2) women who do not share the specific identity feel equally mobilized by both appeals, while those who do are disproportionately more activated by the specific appeal targeting them, or (3) although non-poor women are less mobilized by the specific appeal, the increase in mobilization among poor women is substantial enough not only to offset the decline but to surpass it.

To evaluate which of those three explanations is driving the aggregate results, we look at the estimated coefficients of the second set of models (see Figure 8). Wald tests for estimated effects between broad and intersectional appeals show that the difference in effects is indistinguishable from zero for non-poor women but positive and significant for poor women in the case of participation (p=0.0488 after Bonferroni correction). The difference in effects for protests is significant at 90% only before correction (adjusted p=0.142). This hints

at a situation closer to the second alternative presented above and indicates that the evidence supports the second hypothesis of this study over the first one. Although we do see a higher increase in participation in the movement for women sharing the specific identity, there is no significant reduction in the level of support and participation for women not sharing it. According to my theory, women who share the identity of the appeal in both dimensions at the same time feel more activated when called to participate in a movement that targets their narrower group in particular, which suggests that the collective identity of women in the intersection is stronger. Also, the estimated effect of the encompassing appeal compared to the control group for the case of poor women is close to zero, which aligns with my earlier claim that for women who experience the double bind of violence in various dimensions, a movement that doesn't highlight this and only focuses on the general forms of oppression can feel dominantly coded. This null result also suggests that my findings are not purely driven by demand effects in the context of a survey experiment. Although I cannot rule out that some women may feel compelled to report higher levels of support and interest in participating in the movement only because exposure to the treatment materials leads them to believe that's what the research is expecting of them, the similar responses among poor women seeing the encompassing appeal versus the pure control indicates that simply mentioning women's movements is not enough pressure for my sample to report more engagement. I also expect demand effects to not be strong enough to explain all results because the survey is anonymous and self-administered.

At the same time, non-poor women's openness to an appeal targeting an identity they do not share suggests that their commitment to opposing VAW extends beyond movements that explicitly name them. In other words, their solidarity extends to out-group vulnerable women, which aligns with the concept of intersectional solidarity and linked fate. This finding challenges both the expectations of activists and previous research conducted in the US. This suggests that despite previous evidence showing a tradeoff, movement leaders choosing to use appeals targeting specific vulnerable identities may be able to increase the reach of the movement to more marginalized women while maintaining the base of support they built over time.

6.2 Results Second Wave

The second wave of the experiment presents a harder test of the theory by incorporating a specific identity based on ethnicity, which corresponds to a subgroup with clearer borders and without an official hierarchy of privilege in the way class has. The data collection was also done during period t_5 of the movement timeline (see figure 1), but a whole year after the first one. A moment in which the movement not only had experienced an electoral defeat, but many people in the country associated the rejection of the Constitutional draft with its redistributive approach and explicit reparation efforts towards Indigenous people. Moreover, the activists described this period as a moment of reflection for the movement and less mobilization. Accordingly, in Table 4 we see that the baseline level of support and participation in the movement is lower than what women in the first wave reported.

The results from the estimations confirm some key findings from the first wave, namely that appeals

Figure 8: Effect of movement's appeals on support and participation for women sharing versus not sharing the specific identity - First wave
Considering covariates, only for complete appeals (info + poster). Estimated coefficients and 95% CI.



Table 4: Second wave mean and s.d. values of attitudinal outcomes (0-10) and aggregated mobilization index (0-1) per treatment status

	Control	Encompassing	Specific (poor)	Specific (Indigenous)	Full Sample
Support	6.502 (2.97)	6.869 (2.94)	7.094 (2.84)	6.996 (2.94)	6.866 (2.93)
Participation	4.244 (3.33)	4.288 (3.53)	4.749 (3.42)	4.384 (3.39)	4.417 (3.42)
Protest	3.746 (3.40)	3.845 (3.48)	4.415 (3.49)	4.169 (3.45)	4.044 (3.46)
Mobilization Index	0.483 (0.29)	0.500 (0.30)	0.541 (0.30)	0.518 (0.29)	0.511 (0.29)

generate a positive response in attitudes towards the movement and intentions to mobilize, and that non-vulnerable women do not disengage from the movement when the appeal they receive targets an intersectional identity they do not share compared to when they receive a broad identity appeal. Therefore, after the women's movement mobilized hundreds of thousands of women for several years and achieved popular support and political success using messages highlighting the shared threat of violence and the need for female solidarity, the leaders may be able to narrow their identity appeals to target the most vulnerable within the general group without risking losing support from influential women.

Regarding the effect for the full sample (see Figure 9 and the first three models in Table 5), all forms of appeal generate a positive effect on support and intention to participate/protest, although not always significant at conventional levels. In the case of the outcome of general participation, the effect is never statistically significant, regardless of the identity appeal and specification. The estimated effects for all forms of appeals on every outcome are statistically equivalent and, if anything, the effect of the broad appeal is never higher than the specific ones. For the mobilization index in the specification that only controls for imbalanced covariates (model 2), all forms of appeal significantly increase mobilization ($p<0.05$) after correcting for multiple comparisons using the Holm and Benjamini & Hochberg methods (see Table 35 in the Appendix). With the most conservative Bonferroni corrections, the encompassing appeal effect is rendered insignificant ($p=0.145$), while the p-values for the poor women appeal ($p=0.013$) and Indigenous women appeal ($p=0.057$) survive at the 0.1 level. Remarkably,

this is the total effect for the full sample, in which 70.5% of respondents are non-poor and non-Indigenous.

Figure 9: Effect of movement's appeals on support and participation among all women - Second wave
Estimated coefficients and 95% CI considering covariates



Figure 10 and Models 3 through 9 in Table 5 explore the first and second hypotheses with results for the specification that interacts the appeals with identity groups. For women not sharing the specific identity, the results from the first experiment hold (right-side panels): All forms of appeal generate a similar response. A Wald test on these coefficients confirms that their difference is indistinguishable from zero. Nonetheless, for the mobilization index, among non-poor women the only appeal that generates a significantly higher level of engagement compared to the control group is the poor women appeal, suggesting a sense of intersectional solidarity regarding socioeconomic class.

On the other hand, the results for the vulnerable women show a more complex pattern (left-side panels). First, Indigenous women express surprisingly high levels of engagement with the movement across all outcomes and treatment groups before being exposed to any of the experimental appeals, with significantly higher mean levels of intention to participate and protest compared to non-indigenous women in the control group[19]. Although in this study I cannot unequivocally explain why Indigenous women are more mobilized than other women in this context, the discussion of indigenous rights in the Constitutional process and massive protests in 2019 that included the recognition of Indigenous struggles was unprecedented and may have lead Indigenous women to be particularly activated by the movement in any case; therefore, the outcome questions may have primed them even absent of appeals. The reality is that they entered the study with those attitudes, which suggests that the experimental evaluation for them could suffer from ceiling effects. Consequently, most estimated coefficients of the treatments are negative. But in that disengagement, the appeals focused on the broad identity are the ones that disengage them the most. In the interaction between Indigenous identity and appeals for the model considering all covariates, the effect on general participation is -1.75 (p=0.054) in the interaction with the encompassing appeal, and only -1.26 (p=0.176) and -0.77 (p=0.376) for the poor and Indigenous ones,

[19]In the control group: Indigenous women in a scale from 0 to 10, express 7.18 Support, 5.93 Participation, and 5.46 Protest, compared to 6.43, 4.06, and 3.56 respectively for non-Indigenous women.

Table 5: Effect of various appeal treatments on mobilization index

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9
Encompassing	0.02	0.04^{**}	0.04^{*}	0.00	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.05^{**}	0.05^{**}
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Specific Poor	0.06^{**}	0.06^{***}	0.05^{**}	0.05^{*}	0.05^{**}	0.04^{*}	0.06^{**}	0.07^{***}	0.06^{***}
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Specific Indigenous	0.04	0.05^{**}	0.05^{**}	-0.00	0.02	0.01	0.03	0.05^{**}	0.05^{***}
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
poor			-0.02	-0.09^{**}	-0.06^{*}	-0.07^{**}			-0.02
			(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)			(0.02)
Indigenous			0.06^{**}			0.06^{**}	0.15^{**}	0.14^{**}	0.14^{**}
			(0.03)			(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Encompassing*poor				0.04	0.03	0.02			
				(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)			
SpecPoor*poor				0.04	0.03	0.03			
				(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)			
SpecInd*poor				0.16^{***}	0.14^{***}	0.16^{***}			
				(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)			
Encompassing*Indigenous							-0.17^{**}	-0.12	-0.13^{*}
							(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
SpecPoor*Indigenous							-0.08	-0.09	-0.10
							(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
SpecInd*Indigenous							-0.01	-0.03	-0.08
							(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Linked Fate			0.17^{***}			0.17^{***}			0.17^{***}
			(0.03)			(0.03)			(0.03)
Control mean	0.483	0.483	0.483	0.483	0.483	0.483	0.483	0.483	0.483
Imbalanced covs.	×	✓	✓	×	✓	✓	×	✓	✓
Balanced covs.	×	×	✓	×	×	✓	×	×	✓
R^2	0.01	0.20	0.30	0.01	0.20	0.31	0.02	0.21	0.31
Adj. R^2	0.00	0.19	0.29	0.01	0.20	0.30	0.01	0.20	0.29
Num. obs.	1145	1145	1145	1145	1145	1145	1145	1145	1145
RMSE	0.29	0.26	0.25	0.29	0.26	0.25	0.29	0.26	0.25

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

respectively. Among poor women, the encompassing appeal generates null results again, but instead of a clear increase in engagement when directly targeted with the appeal focusing on violence against poor women, they get activated the most by the indigenous women appeal. For the case of the participation and likelihood of protesting outcomes, the estimated coefficients for the indigenous treatment is significantly higher than for the broad appeal (p=0.061 and p=0.035 in Wald tests), and in the case of support for the movement, it is significantly higher than both the broad (p=0.019) and poor appeals (p=0.008). These results suggest that specific appeals targeting a vulnerable identity may not only be more effective at engaging the women sharing that intersectional identity, but also at activating other marginalized groups, reinforcing the idea of gender solidarity and pointing to a potential coalition building across minorities within women's movements. These findings align with previous work arguing that similar experiences of discrimination and perceptions of inequality towards one vulnerable group lead to increased solidarity by other marginalized subgroups (Harnois 2015; Pérez, Vicuña, and Ramos 2024). It is worth mentioning that only 16.9% of poor women in the sample identify as Indigenous (compared to 10.6% of non-poor women), and the strong mobilizing effect of the Indigenous women's appeal is mostly driven by non-Indigenous poor women.

Regarding the role of gender linked fate in these results, the estimations support the idea that this belief is an important driver of support for the movement and interest in participating in all cases (hypothesis 3). When including the variable in the specification along other covariates, the estimated effect of linked fate is always positive, significant and sizable. In Table 5, we can see that moving from the lowest level of gender linked fate to the highest is associated with an increase in mobilizing attitudes of 0.17 on a zero-to-one scale.

Figure 10: Effect of movement's appeals on support and participation for women sharing versus not-sharing the specific identities primed
Estimated coefficients and 95% CI considering covariates



An interesting finding is that the level of linked fate isn't constant across groups in my sample, with less vulnerable women expressing higher levels than more vulnerable ones. Figure 11 shows the mean level of gender linked fate across socioeconomic classes and their corresponding 95% confidence intervals. The mean value for the whole sample is indicated with a horizontal dashed line. An upward trend is clear and when testing the difference in means between poor and non-poor women, the gender linked fate of the non-poor is significantly higher. This upward trend is consistent across the preferred measure of linked fate combining the responses to both questions described above, and for each question independently. The same trend exists for the case of ethnicity, with self-identified non-Indigenous women expressing higher levels of gender linked fate than Indigenous ones, although this difference is mostly driven by the question focused on the alimony policy, because indigenous women express more agreement than non-indigenous women to the statement that women getting degrees and reaching positions of power gives them hope about their future. These results are not surprising when we consider the cumulative layers of oppression in multiple dimensions that vulnerable women experience in contrast to privileged women, and how, for women in the dominant groups, it may be

easier to connect to the grievances of their gender if that is the only dimension in which they feel the need to collectively protest society. For those women, the well-being of women as a group connects more directly to their self-esteem (Stets and Burke 2000, Kalin and Sambanis 2018). Therefore, these findings suggest that a relevant factor explaining the unexpected experimental results in terms of lack of disengagement from less vulnerable women is the social identity of female potential participants, which activists consciously aimed at developing during the decade of mobilizations and messages framed to increase the salience of gender identity (Stets and Burke 2000), especially among less vulnerable women that can be crucial allies in the struggles of the intersectionaly vulnerable (Manekin, Mitts, and Zeira 2024).

Figure 11: Mean level of gender linked fate per class
mean for full sample in grey = 0.6765



Making sense of results and heterogeneity

The movement's effort to build social identity among women and promote intersectional solidarity through the inclusion of specific identity appeals over time (Tormos 2017, Crowder 2022) can explain that the levels of gender linked fate in my sample are generally high, with a mean level of 0.677 (sd=0.248) in a scale from zero to one, and 75% of the participants expressing a level above 0.5. To put these numbers in context, in his pioneer work on linked fate, Dawson (1994) finds that the mean level of racial linked fate among African-Americans was 0.56 in 1984 and 0.593 in 1988[20]. In the 2019 sample of Bonilla and Tillery (2020), the mean value was 0.77. And in the case of Gay, Hochschild, and White (2016), racial linked fate was about 0.667 among African-Americans and less than 0.33 among Hispanics. They also measured gender linked fate, whose mean was about 0.57. In all of those studies, they used the classic survey question to measure linked fate, which makes this comparison somewhat inappropriate. Nonetheless, after both waves of the experiment, I conducted a smaller pilot data collection of Chilean women using the same method to pre-test alternative experimental materials and included both measures of linked fate, mine and the classic one, to see their relation. Among women not primed to think about gender (N=124), the mean level of gender linked fate using my measure was 0.69 and with the classic question was 0.75, so there is reason to believe that the mean level of gender linked fate in my sample reflects a generally high perception of interconnectedness with other women in Chile, regardless of the measure.

[20]Both Dawson (1994) and Gay, Hochschild, and White (2016) use a linked fate measure that categorizes the level of agreement with "Do you think that what happens generally to the [identity group] in this country will have something to do with what happens in your life?" in a 4 point scale. I standardized their measure to be between 0 and 1 to make it comparable to mine and others.

Table 6: Heterogeneity per gender linked fate (full sample): Effect of various appeal treatments on mobilization index

	Full sample	Low LF	Middle LF	High LF
(Intercept)	0.41***	0.33***	0.37***	0.51***
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Encompassing	0.04**	0.02	0.05	0.06
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Poor	0.06***	0.07*	0.08**	0.05
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Indigenous	0.05**	0.05	0.07*	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Control Mean	0.483	0.415	0.420	0.608
Imbalanced Covs.	✓	✓	✓	✓
R^2	0.20	0.08	0.22	0.27
Adj. R^2	0.19	0.07	0.21	0.26
Num. obs.	1145	422	354	369
RMSE	0.26	0.28	0.24	0.24

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

At this time, I cannot evaluate how women would have reacted to the various identity appeals if they did not already share a collective identity. Nonetheless, examining heterogeneity by linked fate –separating the sample in three similarly-sized groups per LF– is informative about baseline orientations (see Appendix for a deeper analysis). I also consider heterogeneous effects by ideology[21] to better understand how political views shape responses to different identity appeals. Not only women's issues and women's protests tend to be more salient among the left-wing, but class and ethnic solidarity are also more associated with that ideology both in Chile and beyond. Women with higher levels of gender linked fate display consistently stronger mobilization attitudes across conditions, suggesting they are committed supporters unlikely to disengage regardless of framing. By contrast, those with lower levels of linked fate resemble right-wing women in showing weaker baseline support for mobilization, especially among non-vulnerable women, and with only a weak exception for appeals centered on poor women. Left-wing and high linked fate groups start from a much higher baseline. Although the differences in effects are not statistically significant, there is suggestive evidence that most responsive groups are women with middle levels of linked fate or centrist ideologies, who begin with moderate support but show greater openness to movement appeals, particularly intersectional ones. These patterns suggest that while right-wing and low linked fate women remain difficult to mobilize, intersectional appeals can resonate with women at the center without alienating those already strongly committed. In other words, appeals may be most effective at activating women who are not deeply committed but remain open to persuasion.

Finally, women's perceptions of who benefits from the movement indicate alignment with activist goals (see table 31 in the Appendix): most see it as serving women in general, victims of violence, and vulnerable women (46.3%, 43.1%, and 41% respectively in the control group), while very few believe it benefits men, political elites, or no one at all (7.1%, around 20% and 5,7% respectively in the control). Notably, Indigenous women appeals strengthen perceptions that the movement benefits both vulnerable groups and society at large, reinforcing the idea that intersectional framings can enhance legitimacy and inclusiveness.

[21] I consider respondents to be on the right-wing group if they express an ideology lower than 5 in a zero-to-ten scale, a centrist group if their ideology is exactly 5, and a left-wing one if it's higher than 5. Ideology level 5 is the modal response.

Table 7: Heterogeneity per gender linked fate (non-vulnerable women): Effect of various appeal treatments on mobilization index

	Full sample	Low LF	Middle LF	High LF
(Intercept)	0.41***	0.29***	0.41***	0.50***
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Encompassing	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.06
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Poor	0.06**	0.09**	0.04	0.04
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Indigenous	0.02	0.01	0.04	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Control Mean	0.494	0.392	0.466	0.608
Imbalanced Covs.	✓	✓	✓	✓
R^2	0.22	0.10	0.22	0.28
Adj. R^2	0.21	0.09	0.21	0.27
Num. obs.	807	269	268	270
RMSE	0.26	0.27	0.23	0.24

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Table 8: Heterogeneity per ideology: Effect of various appeal treatments on mobilization index

	Full Sample	Right-wing	Centrist	Left-wing
(Intercept)	0.41***	0.32***	0.41***	0.47***
	(0.02)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.03)
Encompassing	0.04**	−0.02	0.06*	0.07**
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Poor	0.06***	0.05	0.08**	0.05*
	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Indigenous	0.05**	−0.01	0.10**	0.06*
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Control Mean	0.483	0.344	0.406	0.605
Imbalanced Covs.	✓	✓	✓	✓
R^2	0.20	0.03	0.09	0.20
Adj. R^2	0.19	0.02	0.07	0.19
Num. obs.	1145	285	363	497
RMSE	0.26	0.27	0.26	0.24

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

7 Conclusion

This article underscores the strategic role of activists in social movement framing, particularly within feminist movements operating in contexts where gender-based solidarity interacts with heterogeneous intersectional identities. Employing a mixed-methods approach that combines survey experiments, social media data, and activist interviews, this study demonstrates that identity-specific appeals, such as those directed toward poor or Indigenous women, can enhance mobilization within these groups without compromising support from the broader movement. These findings challenge prior research suggesting that identity-based appeals inevitably produce a tradeoff by alienating and demobilizing those who are particularly influential outside the targeted identity group. Instead, my results indicate that, in some situations, activists can strategically deploy targeted appeals to cultivate deeper engagement while sustaining broad-based inclusivity.

Descriptive evidence provides insight into the strategic dilemmas movement leaders navigate. Social media and visual appeals data from key organizations within Chile's feminist movement reveal that encompassing posts have been favored by activists over specific ones and tend to receive higher engagement from users, although that gap has shortened in recent years. Movement leaders increasingly integrate identity-specific appeals into their messaging strategies, acknowledging the necessity of recognizing the distinct grievances of marginalized subgroups while maintaining a unifying feminist agenda. Interviews with activists underscore their perception of the potential costs associated with identity-specific framing, in line with the results from previous studies mainly from the U.S. Nonetheless, activists with an intersectional commitment view such appeals as indispensable for amplifying the voices of the most vulnerable women, and have made an honest effort to both integrate their demands and representatives into the movement, as well as to educate the masses to build a collective identity that can foster solidarity, thereby reinforcing the movement's broader transformative potential.

The survey experiment results further illuminate that activists can mobilize dominant groups of women without erasing the voices of vulnerable subgroups through appeals that activate gender identities. Identity-specific appeals were found to (sometimes) significantly increase engagement among both targeted groups —poor and Indigenous women— while not inducing disengagement among non-targeted constituencies. The absence of a demobilization effect among non-vulnerable women stands in contrast to findings from U.S.-based studies of analogous movements, suggesting that Chile's sociopolitical context, characterized by a legacy of collective action and movement efforts to tie individual women's well-being to that of their gender, may attenuate the exclusionary risks associated with intersectional appeals.

The discrepancy between movement leaders' strategic choices and experimental findings suggests that grassroots activists may rely on incomplete information when assessing the impact of their framing strategies, potentially overinterpreting declines in social media engagement as indicative of diminished offline support or using the opinion of regular participants to infer the attitudes of the masses. It may also indicate that their initial assessment may be less valid over time because their communication efforts and successful mobilization have led to growing intersectional solidarity and a positive perception of the movement's goals among Chilean

women. Similar perceptual asymmetries have been documented in studies examining the Black Lives Matter movement before and after 2020.

A relevant factor for these findings, and their divergence from research on racial mobilization, may reside in the gendered dynamics of in-group solidarity. Studies on intersectional frames in race-gender mobilization —contrasting, for instance, the political and social reception of Black women versus Black men— suggest that intersectional cues moderate dominant group stereotypes. McConnaughy and White (2011) find that intersectional frames led white Americans to express less stereotypical perceptions of Black women while reinforcing traditional racialized stereotypes about Black men. More specifically, when attributing characteristics such as violence and nurture, Black women were perceived as more akin to white women than to Black men. This suggests that while social cleavages may persist among men, they may be less salient among women. Although work by Cassesse et al. (2015) challenges this proposition in the U.S. context, future research should explore whether heightened perceptions of intergroup competition, either in terms of race/ethnicity or socioeconomic status, among women in the U.S. underlie these findings. In particular, the extent to which feminist movement participation is perceived as a zero-sum game, where advancing protections for some women necessarily diminishes resources for others, may differ cross-nationally. In Chile, the feminist movement appears to be perceived as synergistic, in which addressing the structural vulnerabilities of historically marginalized women is seen as expanding the gender pie rather than dividing it. This perception may also be heightened by the focus on violence against women, a widespread grievance without obvious distributional consequences. Nonetheless, recent studies interviewing participants in the U.S. Women's Marches have identified that many of them express intersectional concerns as motivation to attend (Fisher, Dow, Ray 2017; Crowder, Smith 2020), especially when compared to participants in demonstrations for other causes (Heaney 2021). Therefore, women's issues may be particularly favorable for creating an inclusive movement even outside of the Chilean case, but a strong sense of interconnectedness among women beyond other social divides has yet to reach women in the general population in other contexts.

These findings yield several theoretical implications for social movement scholarship. First, they suggest that intersectionality may not impose as restrictive a constraint on movement mobilization as previously theorized, particularly in contexts characterized by high levels of linked fate. Feminist movement leaders can effectively leverage identity-specific frames to motivte participation among marginalized subgroups without inducing alienation within broader constituencies. Second, these findings underscore the context-dependent nature of solidarity within feminist movements, indicating a greater receptivity to intersectional appeals in societies where collective gender identity has been historically entrenched, as in Chile. Finally, by integrating qualitative and quantitative methodologies, this study provides a comprehensive assessment of how framing strategies shape engagement, reinforcing the value of a mixed-methods approach for analyzing mobilization dynamics. Ultimately, these findings advance our understanding of the alternative and/or complementary framing strategies available to social movement actors, illustrating how feminist movements can navigate complex identity landscapes to foster both inclusivity and targeted mobilization without a tradeoff.

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Appendix

7.1 Experiment: Recruitment Post

Figure 12: Screenshot of one of the real Facebook ads to recruit participants (reward in CLP$)

7.2 Experiment: Treatment Materials

Information for General Women Appeal

Spanish (original): En el mundo, 1 de cada 3 mujeres es víctima de violencia sexual o física en algún momento de su vida. De acuerdo a estadísticas recientes de la Subsecretaria de Prevención del Delito, 41,4% de las mujeres chilenas ha sufrido violencia intrafamiliar a lo largo de su vida y aproximadamente una mujer por semana es asesinada en un femicidio. Ademas, el 64% de las mujeres ha vivido por lo menos un tipo de acoso sexual durante su vida y 25% ha sufrido acoso sexual laboral.

English (translation): Globally, 1 in 3 women is a victim of sexual or physical violence at some point in her life. According to recent statistics from the Undersecretary for Crime Prevention, 41.4% of Chilean women have suffered domestic violence throughout their lives and approximately one woman per week is murdered in a femicide. In addition, 64% of women have experienced at least one type of sexual harassment during their lives and 25% have suffered sexual harassment at work.

Information for Poor Women Appeal

Spanish (original): En el mundo, 1 de cada 3 mujeres es víctima de violencia sexual o física en algún momento de su vida y las mujeres pobres se encuentran en una situación especialmente desventajada para escapar relaciones violentas debido a su falta de recursos. Además, las mujeres y niñas pobres son más vulnerables a la explotación sexual y la probabilidad de que se casen durante su infancia es 2,5 veces mayor. En Chile, las mujeres representan el 55% de quienes se encuentran en situación de pobreza (versus 45% de hombres).

English (translation): Globally, 1 in 3 women is a victim of sexual or physical violence at some point in her life and poor women are especially disadvantaged in escaping violent relationships due to their lack of resources. Furthermore, poor women and girls are more vulnerable to sexual exploitation and are 2.5 times more likely to marry during their childhood. In Chile, women represent 55% of those who live in poverty (versus 45% of men).

Information for Indigenous Women Appeal

Spanish (original): En el mundo, 1 de cada 3 mujeres es víctima de violencia sexual o física en algún momento de su vida y las mujeres indígenas son especialmente vulnerables de ser víctimas de violencia sexual. Esto incluye una mayor exposición al abuso o la trata sexual, al embarazo adolescente y a la violencia doméstica. Al mismo tiempo, las mujeres y niñas indígenas se enfrentan a importantes obstáculos para acceder a la justicia y muchas veces los abusadores gozan de impunidad. En Chile, el 13% de las mujeres pertenece a un pueblo originario.

English (translation): Globally, 1 in 3 women is a victim of sexual or physical violence at some point in her life. According to the United Nations, indigenous women are especially vulnerable to being victims of gender violence; this includes increased exposure to sexual violence, trafficking, and domestic violence. At the same time, indigenous women and girls face significant obstacles to accessing justice, and abusers often enjoy impunity. In Chile, 13% of women belong to an indigenous group and face these increased risks.

Figure 13: Posters for treatments in Spanish

7.3 Experiment: Geographical distribution of samples

Chile is divided into 16 regions from north to south. The capital, Santiago, is located in the Metropolitan Region at the center of the country, and 40.1% of women live in that region according to the 2024 Census data. The experimental samples in both waves have a slight over-representation of women in the Metropolitan Region and a small under-representation of women in the northern regions, especially in the second wave of the experiment. Other than that, the geographical distribution of women in my samples closely resembles the national population.

Table 9: Share of women living in each region from north to south: Population (2024) vs samples

Region name	Population	First wave	Second wave
Arica y Parinacota	1.3%	1.5%	0.6%
Tarapaca	2.0%	1.9%	0.7%
Antofagasta	3.4%	2.2%	1.1%
Atacama	1.6%	1.5%	1.5%
Coquimbo	4.5%	2.7%	3.5%
Valparaiso	10.3%	12.3%	14.1%
Metropolitana de Santiago	40.1%	48.0%	45.9%
Libertador General Bernardo OHiggins	5.3%	4.3%	4.5%
Maule	6.1%	4.9%	5.7%
Nuble	2.8%	1.6%	1.9%
Biobio	8.8%	7.1%	7.5%
La Araucania	5.5%	4.8%	4.8%
Los Rios	2.2%	1.6%	3.0%
Los Lagos	4.8%	4.7%	4.1%
Aysen del General Carlos Ibanez del Campo	0.5%	0.3%	0.5%
Magallanes y de la Antartica Chilena	0.9%	0.7%	0.6%

7.4 Experiment: Attrition

By design, respondents were forced to answer every question to move forward to the next. Only in the case of experiences of victimization, participants could choose the alternative "I rather not answer" which constitutes a missing value for that variable. Therefore, if participants didn't want to answer a particular question, got bored,

Figure 14: Geographical distribution - Share of women per region (north to south)



Table 10: First wave attrition

	Number of participants at each stage			
treatment	Randomization	After treatment	Attrition	Retention
Control	376	279	−97	74.2%
Info Enc	377	267	−110	70.8%
Info Spec	377	278	−99	73.7%
Appeal Enc	378	260	−118	68.8%
Appeal Spec	376	266	−110	70.7%
Full sample	1884	1350	−534	71.66%

or had technological issues, they dropped out of the survey. Also, after the first characterization questions, the survey system would automatically exclude minors, men, and people outside of Chile, preventing them from moving forward.

In the first wave, 2874 people consented to participate and their answers were recorded, even though only 2657 stayed after the very first question. After most relevant characterization questions and before the personal victimization item, 302 respondents had dropped leaving 1977 people at that stage. At the stage of randomization to assign the treatment status, the sample was 1884. After the treatment assignment, the full sample used for analysis was 1350 participants representing a 71.66% of retention (see Table 10). Despite the sizable attrition, the share of retention is not significantly different across treatment groups. Attrition varies according to some personal characteristics. In simple linear estimations using the retention share as dependent variable we can see that, at 95% significance, retention is higher for higher socioeconomic classes and more educated women, lower for poor women and mothers (women with children), and there's no effect of ideology on attrition.

In the second wave, 2279 people consented to participate and their answers were recorded, even though only 2078 stayed after the very first question. After most relevant characterization questions and before the

Table 11: Second wave attrition

	Number of participants at each stage			
treatment	Randomization	After treatment	Attrition	Retention
Control	298	292	−6	97.99%
Encompassing	298	296	−2	99.33%
Indigenous	299	287	−12	95.99%
Poor	298	293	−5	98.32%
Full sample	1193	1168	−25	97.90%

personal victimization item, 1031 of the original respondents had dropped leaving 1248 people at that stage. The largest drop (404 women) happened by the question on ideological position, suggesting that women less interested on sharing political opinions decided not to move forward. Thankfully, this attrition does not affect the experimental identification. At the stage of randomization to assign the treatment status, the sample was 1193. After the treatment assignment, most women continued in the study, defining a sample used for analysis of 1168 participants representing a 97.9% of retention (see Table 11). This low level of attrition after experimental assignment is encouraging for the validity of results. Still, the share of retention is higher for women assigned to the encompassing appeal (99.3%) and lower for the group that was presented with the Indigenous appeal (95.99%), but the great retention among groups leads to very equivalent mean and standard deviation values of relevant pre-treatment characteristics for each group before and after attrition. At 95% significance, education has a small and positive effect on retention and being a mother has a negative effect. Among poor women, there was more attrition when they were presented with the poor women appeal compared to the control, but again, the number of women who didn't answer outcome questions after the experiment is very low. In this case, only two poor women presented with the poor appeal didn't answer the outcome questions.

Figure 15: Retention of participants after randomized assignment to treatment:
First wave (left) and second wave (right)



Table 12: Attrition First Wave (a) - Effect of treatment status and personal characteristics on staying in sample post treatment assignment

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
(Intercept)	0.74***	0.75***	0.70***	0.68***	0.73***	0.76***	0.75***
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)
factor(T)1	−0.03	−0.03	0.09	−0.03	−0.06	−0.03	−0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.08)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.04)
factor(T)2	−0.00	−0.00	0.04	−0.01	−0.10*	−0.01	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.04)
factor(T)3	−0.05*	−0.05	−0.04	−0.05	−0.12**	−0.05*	−0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.08)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.04)
factor(T)4	−0.03	−0.03	0.02	−0.03	−0.06	−0.03	−0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.08)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.04)
ideology		−0.00	0.01				
		(0.00)	(0.01)				
factor(T)1:ideology			−0.02*				
			(0.01)				
factor(T)2:ideology			−0.01				
			(0.01)				
factor(T)3:ideology			−0.00				
			(0.01)				
factor(T)4:ideology			−0.01				
			(0.01)				
class				0.05***	0.01		
				(0.01)	(0.02)		
factor(T)1:class					0.03		
					(0.03)		
factor(T)2:class					0.08**		
					(0.03)		
factor(T)3:class					0.06*		
					(0.03)		
factor(T)4:class					0.03		
					(0.03)		
poor						−0.06**	−0.02
						(0.02)	(0.05)
factor(T)1:poor							−0.00
							(0.07)
factor(T)2:poor							−0.08
							(0.08)
factor(T)3:poor							−0.10
							(0.08)
factor(T)4:poor							−0.02
							(0.07)
R^2	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.01
Adj. R^2	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.00
Num. obs.	1884	1884	1884	1884	1884	1884	1884
RMSE	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

7.5 First Wave of Experiment

The original experiment considered three attitudinal outcomes: Level of support for the movement, the likelihood of participating in the movement in any of their future activities, and the likelihood of attending the next protest. There was also a behavioral outcome in which participants were asked to donate part of their reward to a women's organization if they won the raffle. They could choose between three different amounts (plus the option to not donate), and their donation would be matched if they did. Unfortunately, this behavioral outcome proved to be an inappropriate measure of movement participation in this context because donating to social movements isn't common practice in Chile, and it even sparked criticism and suspicion among the survey respondents. The vast majority of respondents didn't donate and almost all variation in this outcome can be

Table 13: Attrition First Wave (b) - Effect of treatment status and personal characteristics on staying in sample post treatment assignment

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
(Intercept)	0.74***	0.95***	0.89***	0.63***	0.67***	0.86***	0.88***
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.04)
factor(T)1	−0.03	−0.04	0.09	−0.03	−0.04	−0.03	−0.10
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.08)	(0.03)	(0.06)
factor(T)2	−0.00	−0.01	0.03	−0.01	−0.06	−0.00	−0.01
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.08)	(0.03)	(0.06)
factor(T)3	−0.05*	−0.06*	0.02	−0.05	−0.16**	−0.05	−0.09
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.08)	(0.03)	(0.06)
factor(T)4	−0.03	−0.04	0.04	−0.03	−0.06	−0.03	−0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.08)	(0.03)	(0.06)
age		−0.06***	−0.04***				
		(0.01)	(0.01)				
factor(T)1:age			−0.04*				
			(0.02)				
factor(T)2:age			−0.01				
			(0.02)				
factor(T)3:age			−0.02				
			(0.02)				
factor(T)4:age			−0.03				
			(0.02)				
educ				0.04***	0.02		
				(0.01)	(0.02)		
factor(T)1:educ					0.00		
					(0.02)		
factor(T)2:educ					0.02		
					(0.02)		
factor(T)3:educ					0.03		
					(0.02)		
factor(T)4:educ					0.01		
					(0.02)		
hijes						−0.14***	−0.17***
						(0.02)	(0.05)
factor(T)1:hijes							0.09
							(0.07)
factor(T)2:hijes							0.02
							(0.07)
factor(T)3:hijes							0.04
							(0.07)
factor(T)4:hijes							0.00
							(0.07)
R^2	0.00	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
Adj. R^2	−0.00	0.04	0.04	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Num. obs.	1884	1884	1884	1884	1884	1884	1884
RMSE	0.45	0.44	0.44	0.45	0.45	0.45	0.45

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

explained by access to resources (class and education), more protest experience, and being left-wing. Therefore, the analysis of this outcome is omitted in the main text of this paper, and the question wasn't included in further iterations of the experiment.

Also, this experiment presented both identity appeal treatments in two stages: a complete appeal that considers an informational paragraph highlighting the problem and statistics of VAW for the particular identity group and a poster calling for action versus a purely informational appeal that omits the poster. The goal for doing this was to evaluate whether the reactions were significantly different and to disentangle the effect of simply learning about the problem from the more realistic treatment that replicates the efforts done by movement leaders by problematizing and calling for action. The estimated effects of both forms of treatment

Table 14: Attrition Second Wave (a) - Effect of treatment status and personal characteristics on staying in sample post treatment assignment

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
(Intercept)	0.98***	0.98***	0.99***	0.98***	0.99***	0.98***	0.97***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
factor(T)1	0.01	0.01	−0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
factor(T)2	−0.02	−0.02	−0.02	−0.02	−0.02	−0.02	−0.02
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
factor(T)3	0.00	0.00	−0.01	0.00	−0.03	0.00	0.02
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
ideology		0.00	−0.00				
		(0.00)	(0.00)				
factor(T)1:ideology			0.01				
			(0.00)				
factor(T)2:ideology			0.00				
			(0.01)				
factor(T)3:ideology			0.00				
			(0.00)				
class				0.00	−0.01		
				(0.00)	(0.01)		
factor(T)1:class					−0.00		
					(0.01)		
factor(T)2:class					0.00		
					(0.01)		
factor(T)3:class					0.02*		
					(0.01)		
poor						0.00	0.03**
						(0.01)	(0.01)
factor(T)1:poor							−0.02
							(0.01)
factor(T)2:poor							−0.02
							(0.03)
factor(T)3:poor							−0.06**
							(0.03)
R^2	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Adj. R^2	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01
Num. obs.	1193	1193	1193	1193	1193	1193	1193
RMSE	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.14

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

are in the same direction, and their difference is indistinguishable from zero(see table 19). The main analysis in the text considers only complete appeals because they represent the most realistic effort that activists in this context do, but here I include the full pre-registered analysis. The following results respond to these specifications:

$$(1) Y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 InfoEnc + \beta_2 InfoPoor + \beta_3 AppealEnc + \beta_4 AppealPoor + \theta \mathbf{X}_i + \epsilon_i$$

$$(2) Y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 InfoEnc + \beta_2 InfoPoor + \beta_3 AppealEnc + \beta_4 AppealPoor + \beta_5 Poor +$$
$$\beta_6 InfoEnc * Poor + \beta_7 InfoPoor * Poor + \beta_8 AppealEnc * Poor + \beta_9 AppealPoor * Poor + \theta \mathbf{X}_i + \epsilon_i$$

Table 15: Attrition Second Wave (b) - Effect of treatment status and personal characteristics on staying in sample post treatment assignment

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
(Intercept)	0.98***	0.97***	0.97***	0.95***	0.98***	1.00***	1.00***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.00)
factor(T)1	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.01	−0.00	0.01	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.00)
factor(T)2	−0.02	−0.02	−0.01	−0.02	−0.06*	−0.02	−0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.00)
factor(T)3	0.00	0.00	−0.01	0.01	−0.03	0.00	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.00)
age		0.00	0.00				
		(0.00)	(0.01)				
factor(T)1:age			−0.00				
			(0.01)				
factor(T)2:age			−0.00				
			(0.01)				
factor(T)3:age			0.00				
			(0.01)				
educ				0.01***	0.00		
				(0.00)	(0.00)		
factor(T)1:educ					0.01		
					(0.01)		
factor(T)2:educ					0.01		
					(0.01)		
factor(T)3:educ					0.01		
					(0.01)		
hijes						−0.03***	−0.02**
						(0.01)	(0.01)
factor(T)1:hijes							0.02
							(0.01)
factor(T)2:hijes							−0.03
							(0.02)
factor(T)3:hijes							0.00
							(0.01)
R^2	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.01
Adj. R^2	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01
Num. obs.	1193	1193	1193	1193	1193	1193	1193
RMSE	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.14

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Table 16: First wave - Mean values of sample characteristics per treatment status

	Control	Info Encompassing	Info Specific	Complete Encomp.	Complete Specific
age (0-7)	3.201	3.045	3.108	3.073	3.034
education (0-6)	3.168	3.124	3.256	3.246	3.152
ideology (0-10)	5.570	5.532	5.484	5.742	5.648
urban (0-1)	0.903	0.843	0.881	0.846	0.822
class (0-4)	1.161	1.101	1.321	1.219	1.083
protest exp (0-2)	0.846	0.805	0.838	0.865	0.837
victim (0-6)	3.100	3.157	3.242	3.331	3.333
poor (0-1)	0.262	0.273	0.206	0.223	0.280
indigenous (0-1)	0.129	0.165	0.094	0.135	0.129
children (0-1)	0.763	0.805	0.794	0.781	0.795
daughter (0-1)	0.573	0.592	0.625	0.604	0.652

Table 17: First wave - Mean values of outcomes (0-10) per treatment status

	Control	Info Encompassing	Info Specific	Complete Encomp.	Complete Specific
Support	7.250	7.729	7.788	7.682	8
Participation	4.808	5.350	5.281	5.431	5.585
Protest	4.315	4.989	4.861	4.929	5.155
Donation	0.862	0.876	0.869	0.941	0.841

Figure 16: First wave - Distribution and mean of outcome variables (full sample)



Figure 17: Effect of movement's appeals on support and participation among all women (H1)
Considering covariates, donation outcome, and separation of appeals between only information and info + poster



Table 18: Effect of various appeal treatments on interest to donate to the movement

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
(Intercept)	0.86^{***}	0.52^{***}	0.90^{***}	0.49^{***}
	(0.06)	(0.14)	(0.07)	(0.15)
InfEnc	0.01	0.03	0.07	0.07
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.10)
InfSpec	0.08	0.06	0.11	0.10
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.10)
AppEnc	0.01	−0.01	0.05	0.04
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.10)
AppSpec	−0.02	−0.02	−0.01	−0.00
	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.10)
age		0.01		0.01
		(0.02)		(0.02)
educ		0.06^{***}		0.06^{***}
		(0.02)		(0.02)
poor		-0.18^{***}	−0.13	−0.08
		(0.06)	(0.13)	(0.14)
ideology		0.03^{***}		0.03^{***}
		(0.01)		(0.01)
protest_exp		0.08^{**}		0.08^{**}
		(0.04)		(0.04)
victim		0.01		0.01
		(0.02)		(0.02)
victim_missing		0.05		0.04
		(0.13)		(0.13)
children		-0.18^{*}		-0.17^{*}
		(0.10)		(0.10)
daughter		0.06		0.06
		(0.07)		(0.07)
InfEnc:poor			−0.21	−0.15
			(0.18)	(0.18)
InfSpec:poor			−0.16	−0.17
			(0.19)	(0.19)
AppEnc:poor			−0.25	−0.19
			(0.19)	(0.19)
AppSpec:poor			−0.05	−0.06
			(0.19)	(0.19)
R^2	0.00	0.05	0.02	0.05
Adj. R^2	−0.00	0.04	0.01	0.03
Num. obs.	1329	1329	1329	1329
RMSE	1.01	0.99	1.00	0.99

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Table 19: F-Tests to evaluate whether both stages of appeals (complete versus informational) generate statistically similar effects

	Support		Participation		Protest		Donation	
	F	Pr(>F)	F	Pr(>F)	F	Pr(>F)	F	Pr(>F)
Encompassing appeal	0.1178	0.7315	0.0399	0.8417	0.054	0.9417	0.0983	0.7539
Specific appeal	0.8166	0.3662	0.0366	0.8483	0.0005	0.982	1.0883	0.2969

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 20: Effect of various appeal treatments on support and participation in the movement (all treatment arms, only info vs info+poster)

	Dependent variable:											
	Support					Participation				Protest		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
(Intercept)	7.25***	5.57***	7.12***	5.55***	4.82***	3.36***	4.82***	3.41***	4.32***	2.59***	4.43***	2.69***
	(0.17)	(0.39)	(0.20)	(0.39)	(0.20)	(0.44)	(0.23)	(0.45)	(0.21)	(0.44)	(0.24)	(0.45)
T Encompassing (info)	0.49**	0.47**	0.59**	0.51**	0.54*	0.51**	0.62*	0.48*	0.68**	0.67***	0.64*	0.49*
	(0.24)	(0.22)	(0.27)	(0.24)	(0.29)	(0.24)	(0.34)	(0.27)	(0.30)	(0.24)	(0.34)	(0.27)
T Specific (info)	0.43*	0.34	0.49*	0.40	0.59**	0.45*	0.51	0.39	0.62**	0.48*	0.56*	0.45
	(0.24)	(0.22)	(0.28)	(0.25)	(0.29)	(0.25)	(0.33)	(0.28)	(0.29)	(0.24)	(0.34)	(0.28)
T Encompassing (comp)	0.53**	0.53**	0.65**	0.59**	0.44	0.42*	0.59*	0.53*	0.52*	0.49*	0.52	0.47
	(0.24)	(0.23)	(0.28)	(0.26)	(0.29)	(0.25)	(0.33)	(0.28)	(0.30)	(0.25)	(0.34)	(0.29)
T Specific (comp)	0.73***	0.65***	0.66**	0.62**	0.75***	0.64***	0.49	0.45	0.84***	0.75***	0.50	0.46
	(0.23)	(0.21)	(0.27)	(0.25)	(0.28)	(0.24)	(0.33)	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.25)	(0.34)	(0.29)
age		−0.23***		−0.23***		−0.43***		−0.43***		−0.36***		−0.36***
		(0.06)		(0.06)		(0.07)		(0.07)		(0.07)		(0.07)
education		0.09		0.09		−0.07		−0.07		−0.13**		−0.13**
		(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.06)		(0.06)		(0.06)		(0.06)
poor		0.45**	0.50	0.55		0.16	0.00	0.04		−0.08	−0.41	−0.47
		(0.18)	(0.38)	(0.37)		(0.20)	(0.46)	(0.38)		(0.20)	(0.46)	(0.37)
ideology		0.21***		0.21***		0.19***		0.19***		0.19***		0.19***
		(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)
protest_exp		0.53***		0.53***		1.47***		1.47***		1.78***		1.78***
		(0.09)		(0.09)		(0.11)		(0.11)		(0.11)		(0.11)
victim		0.12***		0.12***		0.20***		0.20***		0.18***		0.18***
		(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.05)
victim_missing		0.73*		0.72*		1.11***		1.13***		1.36***		1.37***
		(0.38)		(0.39)		(0.43)		(0.43)		(0.44)		(0.44)
children		−0.19		−0.18		−0.13		−0.11		−0.11		−0.08
		(0.25)		(0.25)		(0.28)		(0.28)		(0.28)		(0.28)
daughter		0.18		0.19		0.13		0.14		0.35		0.35
		(0.20)		(0.20)		(0.22)		(0.22)		(0.22)		(0.22)
T Encompassing (i) * poor			−0.40	−0.14			−0.31	0.12			0.17	0.68
			(0.55)	(0.52)			(0.68)	(0.60)			(0.69)	(0.59)
T Specific (i) * poor			−0.21	−0.26			0.36	0.23			0.18	0.06
			(0.57)	(0.54)			(0.66)	(0.59)			(0.67)	(0.57)
T Encompassing (C) * poor			−0.46	−0.28			−0.73	−0.60			−0.12	0.01
			(0.58)	(0.55)			(0.69)	(0.61)			(0.70)	(0.61)
T Specific (c) * poor			0.21	0.09			0.93	0.70			1.24*	1.05*
			(0.51)	(0.48)			(0.63)	(0.54)			(0.65)	(0.57)
R^2	0.01	0.15	0.01	0.15	0.01	0.27	0.01	0.27	0.01	0.29	0.01	0.29
Adj. R^2	0.00	0.14	0.01	0.14	0.00	0.26	0.00	0.26	0.00	0.28	0.00	0.28
Num. obs.	1347	1347	1347	1347	1347	1347	1347	1347	1347	1347	1347	1347
RMSE	2.73	2.54	2.73	2.55	3.38	2.91	3.38	2.91	3.47	2.95	3.47	2.95

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Table 21: Effect of various appeal treatments on support and participation in the movement (grouping treatment levels per identity)

	Dependent variable:											
	Support					Participation				Protest		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
(Intercept)	7.25***	5.58***	7.12***	5.55***	4.82***	3.37***	4.82***	3.41***	4.32***	3.26***	4.43***	2.71***
	(0.17)	(0.39)	(0.20)	(0.39)	(0.20)	(0.44)	(0.23)	(0.45)	(0.21)	(0.40)	(0.24)	(0.45)
T Encompassing	0.51**	0.50***	0.63***	0.55**	0.49*	0.46**	0.60**	0.51**	0.60**	0.60***	0.58*	0.48**
	(0.21)	(0.19)	(0.24)	(0.22)	(0.25)	(0.21)	(0.29)	(0.24)	(0.26)	(0.21)	(0.30)	(0.24)
T Specific	0.58***	0.49***	0.57**	0.51**	0.67***	0.54***	0.50*	0.42*	0.73***	0.64***	0.53*	0.45*
	(0.21)	(0.19)	(0.24)	(0.22)	(0.25)	(0.21)	(0.29)	(0.24)	(0.25)	(0.21)	(0.30)	(0.24)
age		−0.23***		−0.23***		−0.43***		−0.43***		−0.40***		−0.35***
		(0.06)		(0.06)		(0.07)		(0.07)		(0.06)		(0.07)
education		0.09		0.09		−0.07		−0.07		−0.12*		−0.14**
		(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.06)		(0.06)		(0.06)		(0.06)
poor		0.45**	0.50	0.55		0.17	0.00	0.04		−0.02	−0.41	−0.47
		(0.18)	(0.38)	(0.37)		(0.20)	(0.46)	(0.38)		(0.20)	(0.46)	(0.37)
ideology		0.21***		0.21***		0.19***		0.19***		0.18***		0.19***
		(0.03)		(0.03)		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.04)
protest_exp		0.53***		0.53***		1.47***		1.46***		1.84***		1.77***
		(0.09)		(0.09)		(0.11)		(0.11)		(0.11)		(0.11)
victim		0.12***		0.12***		0.20***		0.20***				0.18***
		(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.05)				(0.05)
victim_missing		0.72*		0.72*		1.11***		1.14***		0.79*		1.39***
		(0.38)		(0.38)		(0.43)		(0.43)		(0.41)		(0.43)
children		−0.20		−0.19		−0.13		−0.13		−0.12		−0.11
		(0.25)		(0.25)		(0.28)		(0.28)		(0.28)		(0.28)
daughter		0.19		0.20		0.13		0.14		0.37*		0.35
		(0.20)		(0.20)		(0.22)		(0.22)		(0.22)		(0.22)
T Encompasing * poor			−0.43	−0.21			−0.49	−0.20			0.05	0.39
			(0.48)	(0.46)			(0.58)	(0.51)			(0.59)	(0.50)
T Specific * poor			0.04	−0.04			0.68	0.50			0.77	0.62
			(0.46)	(0.44)			(0.56)	(0.48)			(0.57)	(0.48)
R^2	0.01	0.14	0.01	0.14	0.01	0.27	0.01	0.27	0.01	0.28	0.01	0.29
Adj. R^2	0.01	0.14	0.01	0.14	0.00	0.26	0.01	0.26	0.00	0.27	0.00	0.28
Num. obs.	1347	1347	1347	1347	1347	1347	1347	1347	1347	1347	1347	1347
RMSE	2.73	2.54	2.73	2.55	3.38	2.91	3.37	2.91	3.47	2.97	3.47	2.95

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Figure 18: Effect of movement's appeals on support and participation among all women (H1)
Considering covariates, donation outcome, and grouping appeals per identity (information and info + poster)



Figure 19: Effect of movement's appeals on support and participation among all women (H1)
Considering covariates and donation outcome, only for complete appeals (info + poster)



Table 22: Effect of various appeal treatments on support and participation in the movement (only complete appeals: info+poster)

	Dependent variable:											
	Support					Participation				Protest		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
(Intercept)	7.25***	5.23***	7.12***	5.22***	4.82***	3.09***	4.82***	3.13***	4.32***	2.97***	4.43***	2.30***
	(0.17)	(0.48)	(0.20)	(0.49)	(0.20)	(0.57)	(0.23)	(0.57)	(0.21)	(0.52)	(0.24)	(0.57)
T Encompasing	0.53**	0.52**	0.65**	0.58**	0.44	0.39	0.59*	0.52*	0.52*	0.49*	0.52	0.45
	(0.24)	(0.23)	(0.28)	(0.26)	(0.29)	(0.25)	(0.33)	(0.28)	(0.30)	(0.26)	(0.34)	(0.29)
T Specific	0.73***	0.63***	0.66**	0.60**	0.75***	0.61**	0.49	0.41	0.84***	0.73***	0.50	0.42
	(0.23)	(0.21)	(0.27)	(0.25)	(0.28)	(0.25)	(0.33)	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.25)	(0.34)	(0.29)
age		−0.23***		−0.24***		−0.47***		−0.48***		−0.44***		−0.39***
		(0.08)		(0.08)		(0.09)		(0.09)		(0.09)		(0.09)
education		0.15**		0.15**		−0.04		−0.04		−0.11		−0.11
		(0.07)		(0.07)		(0.08)		(0.08)		(0.08)		(0.08)
poor		0.54**	0.50	0.60		0.09	0.00	0.03		−0.08	−0.41	−0.49
		(0.22)	(0.38)	(0.37)		(0.25)	(0.46)	(0.39)		(0.26)	(0.46)	(0.38)
ideology		0.23***		0.23***		0.25***		0.25***		0.24***		0.24***
		(0.04)		(0.04)		(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.05)		(0.05)
protest_exp		0.45***		0.46***		1.29***		1.29***		1.71***		1.65***
		(0.12)		(0.12)		(0.15)		(0.14)		(0.15)		(0.15)
victim		0.12**		0.12**		0.21***		0.21***				0.20***
		(0.06)		(0.06)		(0.06)		(0.06)				(0.06)
victim_missing		0.56		0.56		0.95*		0.97*		0.62		1.28**
		(0.54)		(0.54)		(0.56)		(0.56)		(0.52)		(0.56)
children		−0.19		−0.17		−0.12		−0.07		−0.01		0.02
		(0.32)		(0.31)		(0.37)		(0.36)		(0.37)		(0.37)
daughter		0.39		0.40		0.39		0.41		0.56*		0.56*
		(0.26)		(0.26)		(0.28)		(0.28)		(0.29)		(0.29)
T Encompasing * poor			−0.46	−0.30			−0.73	−0.64			−0.12	−0.01
			(0.58)	(0.56)			(0.69)	(0.61)			(0.70)	(0.61)
T Specific * poor			0.21	0.09			0.93	0.69			1.24*	1.05*
			(0.51)	(0.48)			(0.63)	(0.54)			(0.65)	(0.57)
R^2	0.01	0.14	0.02	0.14	0.01	0.26	0.02	0.26	0.01	0.27	0.02	0.29
Adj. R^2	0.01	0.13	0.01	0.13	0.01	0.25	0.01	0.25	0.01	0.26	0.01	0.27
Num. obs.	820	820	820	820	820	820	820	820	820	820	820	820
RMSE	2.76	2.58	2.75	2.58	3.35	2.92	3.35	2.91	3.48	3.00	3.48	2.98

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Table 23: Re-estimation of main model for full sample with multiple comparison correction adjusted p-values
Methods used: (a) Bonferroni, (b) Holm, (c) Benjamini & Hochberg

		Support	Participation	Protest
TEnc	coeff.	0.518	0.394	0.495
	original p-value	0.023**	0.119	0.054*
	Bonferroni	0.046**	0.238	0.108
	Holm	0.023**	0.238	0.054*
	BH	0.023**	0.238	0.054*
TSpoor	coeff.	0.627	0.606	0.735
	original p-value	0.003***	0.014**	0.003***
	Bonferroni	0.006***	0.028**	0.006***
	Holm	0.006***	0.028**	0.006***
	BH	0.006***	0.028**	0.006***
R^2		0.14	0.26	0.27
Adj. R^2		0.13	0.25	0.26
Num. obs.		820	820	820
Covariates		✓	✓	✓

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

7.6 Second Wave of Experiment

Table 24: Second wave - Mean values of sample characteristics per treatment status

	Control	Encompassing	Indigenous	Poor
age (0-7)	3.495	3.344	3.327	3.258
education (0-6)	3.488	3.488	3.352	3.286
ideology (0-10)	5.555	5.436	5.525	5.596
urban (0-1)	0.855	0.849	0.870	0.847
class (0-4)	1.237	1.275	1.285	1.206
protest exp (0-2)	0.919	0.725	0.785	0.878
victim (0-6)	2.788	2.694	2.725	2.798
poor (0-1)	0.240	0.172	0.218	0.216
indigenous (0-1)	0.099	0.127	0.120	0.132
children (0-1)	0.837	0.794	0.768	0.815
daughter (0-1)	0.806	0.770	0.757	0.805

Figure 20: Second wave - Balance of covariates across treatment arms (95% CI)
Reference category: pure control - Only 'children' and 'protest experience' are imbalanced



Table 25: Second wave - Mean values of outcomes (0-10) per treatment status

	Control	Encompassing	Indigenous	Poor
Support	6.502	6.869	6.996	7.094
Participation	4.244	4.289	4.384	4.749
Protest	3.746	3.845	4.169	4.415

Further estimations of the effect of each form of appeal on the levels of support and participation. Figures in the main text correspond to column 3 of tables 26, 27 and 28 according to each outcome for the full sample, and columns 6 and 9 for the interaction between identities and appeals. Protest experience and whether the respondent has any children (is a mother) are the only relevant pre-treatment covariates that aren't balanced across treatment arms; therefore, columns 2, 5, and 8 correspond to a model specification that only includes the treatments and imbalanced covariates.

Table 26: Effect of various appeal treatments on support for the movement

	Dependent variable:								
	support								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
(Intercept)	6.50^{***}	5.96^{***}	3.32^{***}	6.70^{***}	6.12^{***}	3.46^{***}	6.43^{***}	5.91^{***}	3.28^{***}
	(0.18)	(0.27)	(0.46)	(0.20)	(0.28)	(0.46)	(0.18)	(0.27)	(0.46)
TEnc	0.37	0.55^{**}	0.54^{**}	0.21	0.42	0.40	0.50^{*}	0.63^{***}	0.64^{***}
	(0.25)	(0.23)	(0.22)	(0.28)	(0.26)	(0.25)	(0.26)	(0.24)	(0.23)
TSpoor	0.59^{**}	0.62^{***}	0.57^{**}	0.50^{*}	0.55^{**}	0.48^{*}	0.59^{**}	0.64^{***}	0.60^{**}
	(0.24)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.27)	(0.26)	(0.25)	(0.26)	(0.24)	(0.23)
TSind	0.49^{**}	0.60^{**}	0.59^{***}	0.06	0.20	0.15	0.52^{**}	0.65^{***}	0.71^{***}
	(0.25)	(0.24)	(0.22)	(0.29)	(0.27)	(0.25)	(0.26)	(0.25)	(0.23)
protest_exp		1.07^{***}	0.65^{***}		1.06^{***}	0.64^{***}		1.06^{***}	0.65^{***}
		(0.10)	(0.11)		(0.10)	(0.11)		(0.10)	(0.11)
hijes		-0.53^{***}	-0.48		-0.55^{***}	-0.45		-0.53^{***}	-0.43
		(0.20)	(0.76)		(0.20)	(0.76)		(0.20)	(0.76)
age			-0.17^{***}			-0.17^{***}			-0.16^{***}
			(0.06)			(0.06)			(0.06)
educ			-0.00			0.00			-0.01
			(0.06)			(0.06)			(0.06)
ideology			0.23^{***}			0.23^{***}			0.23^{***}
			(0.04)			(0.04)			(0.04)
hijas			0.55			0.52			0.50
			(0.73)			(0.73)			(0.73)
victim_2			0.11^{**}			0.11^{**}			0.10^{**}
			(0.05)			(0.05)			(0.05)
victim_missing			0.12			0.14			0.09
			(0.36)			(0.36)			(0.36)
poor			0.04	-0.83^{**}	-0.58	-0.65^{*}			0.03
			(0.21)	(0.41)	(0.38)	(0.37)			(0.21)
indigena			0.15			0.17	0.75	0.65	0.75
			(0.28)			(0.27)	(0.63)	(0.62)	(0.63)
linkfate			2.20^{***}			2.23^{***}			2.22^{***}
			(0.35)			(0.35)			(0.35)
TEnc:poor				0.61	0.54	0.53			
				(0.63)	(0.59)	(0.57)			
TSpoor:poor				0.34	0.27	0.32			
				(0.60)	(0.58)	(0.57)			
TSind:poor				1.91^{***}	1.78^{***}	1.94^{***}			
				(0.56)	(0.52)	(0.51)			
TEnc:indigena							-1.19	-0.80	-0.90
							(0.84)	(0.84)	(0.85)
TSpoor:indigena							-0.19	-0.25	-0.40
							(0.82)	(0.83)	(0.83)
TSind:indigena							-0.38	-0.55	-1.05
							(0.85)	(0.82)	(0.79)
R^2	0.01	0.11	0.20	0.02	0.11	0.21	0.01	0.11	0.20
Adj. R^2	0.00	0.10	0.19	0.01	0.11	0.20	0.00	0.10	0.19
Num. obs.	1145	1145	1145	1145	1145	1145	1145	1145	1145
RMSE	2.92	2.78	2.63	2.91	2.77	2.62	2.92	2.78	2.63

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 27: Effect of various appeal treatments on interest to participate in the movement

	Dependent variable:								
	general participation								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
(Intercept)	4.24^{***}	3.63^{***}	1.38^{***}	4.47^{***}	3.76^{***}	1.45^{***}	4.06^{***}	3.49^{***}	1.29^{***}
	(0.20)	(0.28)	(0.48)	(0.22)	(0.30)	(0.49)	(0.20)	(0.29)	(0.48)
TEnc	0.04	0.32	0.25	−0.06	0.25	0.22	0.28	0.47^{*}	0.44^{*}
	(0.29)	(0.25)	(0.24)	(0.32)	(0.29)	(0.28)	(0.30)	(0.26)	(0.25)
TSpoor	0.51^{*}	0.55^{**}	0.39	0.34	0.42	0.27	0.58^{**}	0.64^{**}	0.52^{**}
	(0.28)	(0.26)	(0.24)	(0.32)	(0.29)	(0.27)	(0.30)	(0.27)	(0.25)
TSind	0.14	0.28	0.25	−0.17	0.02	−0.05	0.11	0.28	0.32
	(0.28)	(0.25)	(0.24)	(0.32)	(0.29)	(0.27)	(0.30)	(0.26)	(0.25)
protest_exp		1.64^{***}	1.25^{***}		1.63^{***}	1.24^{***}		1.62^{***}	1.24^{***}
		(0.11)	(0.13)		(0.11)	(0.13)		(0.11)	(0.13)
hijes		-1.06^{***}	0.07		-1.05^{***}	0.14		-1.08^{***}	0.16
		(0.23)	(0.57)		(0.23)	(0.57)		(0.23)	(0.58)
age			-0.34^{***}			-0.34^{***}			-0.34^{***}
			(0.06)			(0.07)			(0.06)
educ			−0.07			−0.06			−0.07
			(0.06)			(0.06)			(0.06)
ideology			0.28^{***}			0.28^{***}			0.28^{***}
			(0.04)			(0.04)			(0.04)
hijas			−0.28			−0.34			−0.36
			(0.53)			(0.52)			(0.53)
victim_2			0.20^{***}			0.20^{***}			0.20^{***}
			(0.05)			(0.05)			(0.05)
victim_missing			1.15^{***}			1.17^{***}			1.13^{***}
			(0.39)			(0.38)			(0.39)
poor			−0.33	-0.96^{**}	−0.55	-0.79^{**}			−0.33
			(0.22)	(0.48)	(0.39)	(0.37)			(0.22)
indigena			0.71^{**}			0.72^{**}	1.87^{***}	1.70^{***}	1.71^{**}
			(0.31)			(0.31)	(0.70)	(0.65)	(0.68)
linkfate			1.66^{***}			1.67^{***}			1.66^{***}
			(0.38)			(0.38)			(0.38)
TEnc:poor				0.25	0.15	−0.01			
				(0.72)	(0.62)	(0.60)			
TSpoor:poor				0.64	0.51	0.49			
				(0.70)	(0.65)	(0.61)			
TSind:poor				1.34^{*}	1.14^{*}	1.32^{**}			
				(0.69)	(0.58)	(0.57)			
TEnc:indigena							-2.23^{**}	-1.60^{*}	-1.75^{*}
							(0.93)	(0.90)	(0.90)
TSpoor:indigena							−1.06	−1.13	−1.26
							(0.93)	(0.93)	(0.93)
TSind:indigena							−0.07	−0.32	−0.77
							(0.92)	(0.83)	(0.87)
R^2	0.00	0.18	0.28	0.01	0.18	0.29	0.02	0.19	0.29
Adj. R^2	0.00	0.18	0.27	0.00	0.18	0.28	0.01	0.19	0.27
Num. obs.	1145	1145	1145	1145	1145	1145	1145	1145	1145
RMSE	3.42	3.11	2.92	3.42	3.11	2.91	3.40	3.09	2.92

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 28: Effect of various appeal treatments on likelihood of joining next protest

	Dependent variable:								
	likelihood of attending next protest								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
(Intercept)	3.75^{***}	2.61^{***}	0.97^{*}	3.97^{***}	2.75^{***}	1.06^{**}	3.56^{***}	2.48^{***}	0.89^{*}
	(0.20)	(0.29)	(0.50)	(0.23)	(0.31)	(0.51)	(0.21)	(0.29)	(0.51)
TEnc	0.10	0.42	0.35	−0.05	0.32	0.28	0.27	0.51^{*}	0.49^{*}
	(0.29)	(0.26)	(0.25)	(0.32)	(0.29)	(0.28)	(0.30)	(0.27)	(0.26)
TSpoor	0.67^{**}	0.73^{***}	0.58^{**}	0.58^{*}	0.67^{**}	0.53^{*}	0.75^{**}	0.83^{***}	0.73^{***}
	(0.29)	(0.26)	(0.25)	(0.32)	(0.29)	(0.28)	(0.30)	(0.27)	(0.26)
TSind	0.42	0.62^{**}	0.58^{**}	0.07	0.32	0.25	0.35	0.58^{**}	0.61^{**}
	(0.29)	(0.26)	(0.24)	(0.32)	(0.29)	(0.28)	(0.30)	(0.27)	(0.26)
protest_exp		1.78^{***}	1.47^{***}		1.77^{***}	1.46^{***}		1.76^{***}	1.46^{***}
		(0.11)	(0.13)		(0.11)	(0.13)		(0.11)	(0.13)
hijes		-0.60^{**}	0.50		-0.61^{**}	0.55		-0.62^{***}	0.57
		(0.23)	(0.52)		(0.24)	(0.52)		(0.23)	(0.53)
age			-0.30^{***}			-0.30^{***}			-0.30^{***}
			(0.07)			(0.07)			(0.07)
educ			−0.07			−0.07			−0.08
			(0.07)			(0.07)			(0.07)
ideology			0.24^{***}			0.24^{***}			0.24^{***}
			(0.04)			(0.04)			(0.04)
hijas			−0.42			−0.47			−0.48
			(0.47)			(0.46)			(0.47)
victim_2			0.14^{**}			0.14^{***}			0.14^{**}
			(0.06)			(0.05)			(0.06)
victim_missing			0.94^{**}			0.97^{**}			0.94^{**}
			(0.39)			(0.38)			(0.38)
poor			−0.31	-0.94^{*}	−0.54	-0.77^{**}			−0.31
			(0.23)	(0.48)	(0.40)	(0.39)			(0.23)
indigena			0.91^{***}			0.93^{***}	1.91^{**}	1.74^{***}	1.75^{***}
			(0.31)			(0.31)	(0.74)	(0.64)	(0.65)
linkfate			1.22^{***}			1.24^{***}			1.22^{***}
			(0.38)			(0.38)			(0.38)
TEnc:poor				0.48	0.36	0.17			
				(0.73)	(0.63)	(0.61)			
TSpoor:poor				0.31	0.23	0.19			
				(0.71)	(0.65)	(0.62)			
TSind:poor				1.53^{**}	1.31^{**}	1.45^{**}			
				(0.71)	(0.61)	(0.59)			
TEnc:indigena							-1.79^{*}	−1.18	−1.34
							(0.95)	(0.88)	(0.87)
TSpoor:indigena							−1.11	−1.24	−1.36
							(0.98)	(0.93)	(0.93)
TSind:indigena							0.27	−0.03	−0.44
							(0.97)	(0.85)	(0.88)
R^2	0.01	0.20	0.27	0.01	0.20	0.27	0.02	0.21	0.27
Adj. R^2	0.00	0.19	0.26	0.01	0.19	0.26	0.02	0.20	0.26
Num. obs.	1145	1145	1145	1145	1145	1145	1145	1145	1145
RMSE	3.45	3.11	2.98	3.45	3.11	2.97	3.43	3.09	2.97

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 29: Effect of various appeal treatments on mobilization index

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9
(Intercept)	0.48^{***}	0.41^{***}	0.19^{***}	0.50^{***}	0.42^{***}	0.20^{***}	0.47^{***}	0.40^{***}	0.18^{***}
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)
TEnc	0.02	0.04^{**}	0.04^{*}	0.00	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.05^{**}	0.05^{**}
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
TSpoor	0.06^{**}	0.06^{***}	0.05^{**}	0.05^{*}	0.05^{**}	0.04^{*}	0.06^{**}	0.07^{***}	0.06^{***}
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
TSind	0.04	0.05^{**}	0.05^{**}	-0.00	0.02	0.01	0.03	0.05^{**}	0.05^{***}
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
protest_exp		0.15^{***}	0.11^{***}		0.15^{***}	0.11^{***}		0.15^{***}	0.11^{***}
		(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.01)	(0.01)
hijes		-0.07^{***}	0.00		-0.07^{***}	0.01		-0.07^{***}	0.01
		(0.02)	(0.04)		(0.02)	(0.04)		(0.02)	(0.04)
age			-0.03^{***}			-0.03^{***}			-0.03^{***}
			(0.01)			(0.01)			(0.01)
educ			-0.00			-0.00			-0.01
			(0.01)			(0.01)			(0.01)
ideology			0.02^{***}			0.02^{***}			0.03^{***}
			(0.00)			(0.00)			(0.00)
hijas			-0.01			-0.01			-0.01
			(0.04)			(0.04)			(0.04)
victim_2			0.01^{***}			0.02^{***}			0.01^{***}
			(0.00)			(0.00)			(0.00)
victim_missing			0.07^{**}			0.08^{**}			0.07^{**}
			(0.03)			(0.03)			(0.03)
poor			-0.02	-0.09^{**}	-0.06^{*}	-0.07^{**}			-0.02
			(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)			(0.02)
indigena			0.06^{**}			0.06^{**}	0.15^{**}	0.14^{**}	0.14^{**}
			(0.03)			(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)
linkfate			0.17^{***}			0.17^{***}			0.17^{***}
			(0.03)			(0.03)			(0.03)
TEnc:poor				0.04	0.03	0.02			
				(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)			
TSpoor:poor				0.04	0.03	0.03			
				(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)			
TSind:poor				0.16^{***}	0.14^{***}	0.16^{***}			
				(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)			
TEnc:indigena							-0.17^{**}	-0.12	-0.13^{*}
							(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
TSpoor:indigena							-0.08	-0.09	-0.10
							(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
TSind:indigena							-0.01	-0.03	-0.08
							(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)
R^2	0.01	0.20	0.30	0.01	0.20	0.31	0.02	0.21	0.31
Adj. R^2	0.00	0.19	0.29	0.01	0.20	0.30	0.01	0.20	0.29
Num. obs.	1145	1145	1145	1145	1145	1145	1145	1145	1145
RMSE	0.29	0.26	0.25	0.29	0.26	0.25	0.29	0.26	0.25

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Table 30: Effect of appeal treatments (aggregating poor and indigenous into specific) on mobilization index

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9
(Intercept)	0.48^{***}	0.41^{***}	0.19^{***}	0.50^{***}	0.42^{***}	0.20^{***}	0.47^{***}	0.40^{***}	0.18^{***}
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)
TEnc	0.02	0.04^{**}	0.04^{*}	0.00	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.05^{**}	0.05^{**}
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
TSpec	0.05^{**}	0.06^{***}	0.05^{***}	0.02	0.04^{*}	0.03	0.05^{**}	0.06^{***}	0.06^{***}
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
protest_exp		0.15^{***}	0.11^{***}		0.15^{***}	0.11^{***}		0.15^{***}	0.11^{***}
		(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.01)	(0.01)
hijes		-0.07^{***}	0.00		-0.07^{***}	0.01		-0.07^{***}	0.01
		(0.02)	(0.04)		(0.02)	(0.04)		(0.02)	(0.04)
age			-0.03^{***}			-0.03^{***}			-0.03^{***}
			(0.01)			(0.01)			(0.01)
educ			-0.00			-0.00			-0.01
			(0.01)			(0.01)			(0.01)
ideology			0.02^{***}			0.03^{***}			0.03^{***}
			(0.00)			(0.00)			(0.00)
hijas			-0.01			-0.01			-0.01
			(0.04)			(0.04)			(0.04)
victim_2			0.01^{***}			0.02^{***}			0.01^{***}
			(0.00)			(0.00)			(0.00)
victim_missing			0.07^{**}			0.07^{**}			0.07^{**}
			(0.03)			(0.03)			(0.03)
poor			-0.02	-0.09^{**}	-0.06^{*}	-0.07^{**}			-0.02
			(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)			(0.02)
indigena			0.06^{**}			0.06^{**}	0.15^{**}	0.14^{**}	0.14^{**}
			(0.03)			(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)
linkfate			0.17^{***}			0.17^{***}			0.17^{***}
			(0.03)			(0.03)			(0.03)
TEnc:poor				0.04	0.03	0.02			
				(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)			
TSpec:poor				0.10^{**}	0.09^{**}	0.10^{**}			
				(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)			
TEnc:indigena							-0.17^{**}	-0.12	-0.13^{*}
							(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
TSpec:indigena							-0.04	-0.06	-0.09
							(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)
R^2	0.00	0.20	0.30	0.01	0.20	0.31	0.02	0.21	0.30
Adj. R^2	0.00	0.20	0.29	0.01	0.20	0.30	0.01	0.20	0.30
Num. obs.	1145	1145	1145	1145	1145	1145	1145	1145	1145
RMSE	0.29	0.26	0.25	0.29	0.26	0.25	0.29	0.26	0.25

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Table 31: Effect of various appeal treatments on perception of who benefits from the movement (share of respondents saying they benefit)

	Feminist activists	Government	Women	Men	Girls	Vulnerable women	Political parties	Society	Myself	No one	Women victims
(Intercept)	0.67^{***}	0.27^{***}	0.10	-0.02	-0.02	0.09	0.40^{***}	-0.13^{*}	-0.04	0.15^{***}	0.19^{**}
	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.08)
TEnc	-0.05	-0.00	0.04	-0.00	0.04	0.01	-0.02	0.06^{*}	0.03	0.03	-0.01
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)
TSpoor	-0.06	-0.01	0.06	-0.02	-0.00	0.02	-0.04	0.05	0.01	-0.02	0.02
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)
TSind	-0.01	-0.02	0.08^{**}	0.02	0.06	0.09^{**}	-0.01	0.07^{**}	0.04	-0.01	0.07^{*}
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.04)
protest_exp	0.00	0.00	0.08^{***}	0.04^{***}	0.07^{***}	0.03	0.01	0.05^{***}	0.06^{***}	-0.01	0.04^{**}
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
children	0.01	0.01	-0.03	-0.02	-0.01	-0.04	-0.00	-0.08^{*}	-0.01	-0.02	-0.07^{*}
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.04)
age	-0.04^{***}	-0.01	-0.05^{***}	-0.02^{***}	-0.05^{***}	-0.01	0.01	-0.01	-0.05^{***}	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)
education	0.01	0.02^{*}	0.01	0.02^{***}	0.02	-0.01	0.01	0.03^{***}	0.01	-0.00	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)
ideology	-0.02^{***}	-0.02^{***}	0.03^{***}	0.00	0.03^{***}	0.03^{***}	-0.02^{***}	0.03^{***}	0.03^{***}	-0.00	0.02^{***}
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)
victim	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01^{***}	0.03^{***}	0.02^{**}	-0.00	0.01^{*}	0.02^{***}	-0.00	0.02^{*}
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)
victim_missing	-0.12^{**}	0.03	0.01	0.05^{**}	0.08	0.02	-0.01	0.01	0.12^{**}	0.01	0.02
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.06)
poor	-0.10^{***}	0.02	-0.02	0.01	-0.06^{*}	-0.07^{*}	0.03	-0.00	-0.03	0.02	-0.01
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)
indigenous	0.03	0.02	-0.08^{*}	-0.02	-0.03	-0.02	0.00	-0.04	-0.06	-0.01	-0.08^{*}
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.05)
link fate	-0.02	-0.06	0.34^{***}	0.04^{*}	0.25^{***}	0.27^{***}	-0.16^{***}	0.22^{***}	0.25^{***}	-0.05	0.25^{***}
	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.06)
Control mean	0.459	0.184	0.463	0.071	0.297	0.410	0.226	0.283	0.261	0.057	0.431
R^2	0.05	0.02	0.16	0.09	0.15	0.08	0.03	0.12	0.15	0.02	0.07
Adj. R^2	0.04	0.01	0.15	0.08	0.14	0.07	0.02	0.11	0.14	0.01	0.06
Num. obs.	1145	1145	1145	1145	1145	1145	1145	1145	1145	1145	1145
RMSE	0.49	0.38	0.46	0.24	0.43	0.48	0.40	0.44	0.42	0.23	0.48

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Table 32: Heterogeneity per linkfate among non-vulnerable women: Effect of various appeal treatments on mobilization index

	Full sample	Low LF	Middle LF	High LF
(Intercept)	0.41***	0.29***	0.41***	0.50***
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Encompassing	0.04	0.04	0.02	0.06
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Poor	0.06**	0.09**	0.04	0.04
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Indigenous	0.02	0.01	0.04	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Control Mean	0.494	0.392	0.466	0.608
Imbalanced Covs.	✓	✓	✓	✓
R^2	0.22	0.10	0.22	0.28
Adj. R^2	0.21	0.09	0.21	0.27
Num. obs.	807	269	268	270
RMSE	0.26	0.27	0.23	0.24

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

7.6.1 Making sense of results and heterogeneity: Longer analysis

At this time, I cannot evaluate how women would have reacted to the various identity appeals if they didn't have a collective identity. Nonetheless, looking at the heterogeneous effects of the appeals by levels of linked fate (LF) can provide some ideas on the role of this variable. See Table 6 for a comparison of effects between the whole sample and dividing it into three groups of a similar number of respondents: Low linked fate with values under 0.62, middle with values between 0.62 and 0.75, and high with values of more than 0.75. There is a higher share of poor (26.3%) and Indigenous women (15.4%) in the low LF group, and a smaller share in the middle LF group (16.95% and 9.3%), but the mean level of linked fate across treatment arms is balanced (see Figure 21). This analysis shows that the group of middle levels of linked fate is the most responsive to appeals, particularly to the specific ones, and that their baseline level of mobilization in the absence of appeals is very similar to the low LF group. Differently, the high LF group has a much stronger mobilization attitude in the control condition, so even though the coefficients for all forms of appeals are positive, they are not significant. These women can be considered as committed supporters of the movement, who do not disengage when receiving a mis-targeted appeal.

I repeat this analysis of heterogeneous effects by ideology to better understand how political views shape responses to different identity appeals. Not only women's issues and women's protests tend to be more salient among the left-wing, but class and ethnic solidarity are also more associated with that ideology both in Chile and beyond. Moreover, there is evidence from the US that having a more liberal ideology is a factor associated with expressing more intersectional motivation when participating in a march (Heaney 2021). Thus, it is worth exploring whether that pattern holds in this context by dividing women into a right-wing group if they express an ideology lower than 5 in a zero-to-ten scale, a centrist group if their ideology is exactly 5, and a left-wing one if it's higher than 5. Ideology is balanced across treatment arms (see Figure 21), there's a slightly lower share of poor and indigenous women in the right-wing (18.3% and 7.7%), and a higher share of indigenous women in the centrist group (14.1%). In this case, the baseline level of mobilization is consistent with the

idea that the right-wing is less supportive and the left-wing more supportive of women's movements. They also respond differently to movement appeals, with the right-wing women having null effects across the board and even negative coefficients for most identity appeals. They only have a positive (although non-significant) coefficient for the poor women appeal that could relate to more conservative women upholding Christian values that favor charity, which I cannot test here. Left-wing women seem to respond positively to all appeals at the 90% significance level, but it is the encompassing appeal the only one with a p-value of less than 0.05 and the (marginally) higher coefficient. More interestingly, it seems to be the group of women with centrist ideologies who are the most responsive to the movement's appeals. Particularly to the appeals centering intersectional identities. These findings suggest that movement leaders have a difficult time engaging right-wing women, regardless of the appeals they use. So, avoiding centering vulnerable women in their framings and appeals in fear of alienating that group may not be worth it, when they can count on the support of left-wing women in most cases, and intersectional appeals may allow them to bring in women in the center.

Finally, regarding the participants' opinion on who benefits from the movement, the main finding is that women in my sample have a perception of the movement that aligns with what the activists think of it and are trying to achieve. Also, the fact that most effects of identity appeals on the share of women selecting different groups are null, indicates that these opinions precede the experiment, reinforcing my argument that the movement has already communicated its messages and built gender consciousness through mobilization.[22] In the baseline, the only groups that more than 40% of respondents think benefit from the movement are: women in general (46.3%), women victims of gender violence and their families (43.1%), vulnerable women (41%), and feminist activists (45.9%). This last group could be an indication that some women distrust the motivations and solidarity of activists, but the (null) negative coefficients for all forms of appeal hint that learning about the movements' concerns could reduce that perception. Moreover, unfortunately, I did not randomize the order of the groups in the list, so I can't rule out that seeing this option on top of the list could have influenced participants to select it more often than others. On the other hand, the groups least selected are the ones that the movement is not centering and are not their goal, such as no one (5.7%), men (7.1%), and the governement (18.4%). This last group, in combination with the fact that only 22.6% of respondents in the control selected political parties, indicates that women understand the movement as a grassroots effort aiming to help citizens and do not see it as being captured by political elites, at least not in a widespread opinion. Notably, it is the Indigenous women appeal the only one that significantly increases the opinion that the movement is benefiting women in general, vulnerable women and victims, and society at large. There is also a positive and close to significant (p=0.0856) effect of the broad appeal on selecting that society benefits, and even though it is not significant, the poor appeal has a positive coefficient of similar magnitude. Other groups with positive, although null effects for all identity appeals is women in general, vulnerable women, and myself. On the opposite side, all appeals have negative coefficients on the perception that the movement benefits feminist activists, the government, and political parties, but these effects are indistinguishable from zero at conventional levels. In all, these results suggest that Chilean women have a positive perception of the movement's role in society, and they think it does improve the well-being of their gender.

[22]It also suggests that demand effects may not be driving the findings.

Table 33: Heterogeneity per ideology: Effect of various appeal treatments on mobilization index

	Full Sample	Right-wing	Centrist	Left-wing	Full Sample	Full Sample	Full Sample
(Intercept)	0.407***	0.323***	0.415***	0.473***	0.412***	0.295***	0.308***
	(0.024)	(0.055)	(0.046)	(0.032)	(0.023)	(0.038)	(0.050)
TEnc	0.043**	−0.019	0.065*	0.065**			
	(0.022)	(0.045)	(0.039)	(0.029)			
TSpoor	0.063***	0.054	0.083**	0.051*			
	(0.022)	(0.045)	(0.041)	(0.031)			
TSind	0.050**	−0.009	0.096**	0.056*			
	(0.021)	(0.045)	(0.038)	(0.029)			
protest_exp	0.150***	0.062**	0.092***	0.140***	0.149***	0.116***	0.116***
	(0.010)	(0.030)	(0.021)	(0.014)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.010)
hijes	−0.073***	−0.007	−0.079**	−0.068***	−0.073***	−0.062***	−0.061***
	(0.020)	(0.046)	(0.037)	(0.024)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.019)
T2					0.027***	0.013	−0.017
					(0.009)	(0.023)	(0.033)
ideology						0.025***	0.017
						(0.006)	(0.018)
T2:ideology						0.002	0.017
						(0.004)	(0.013)
ideology^2							0.001
							(0.002)
T2:ideology^2							−0.001
							(0.001)
R^2	0.198	0.035	0.088	0.197	0.198	0.248	0.250
Adj. R^2	0.195	0.017	0.075	0.189	0.195	0.245	0.245
Num. obs.	1145	285	363	497	1145	1145	1145
RMSE	0.263	0.266	0.259	0.242	0.263	0.255	0.255

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Table 34: Heterogeneity per linkfate: Effect of various appeal treatments on mobilization index

	Full sample	Low LF	Middle LF	High LF	Full sample	Full sample	Full sample
(Intercept)	0.407***	0.333***	0.373***	0.505***	0.412***	0.240***	0.310***
	(0.024)	(0.045)	(0.040)	(0.038)	(0.023)	(0.045)	(0.088)
TEnc	0.043**	0.019	0.054	0.057			
	(0.022)	(0.038)	(0.034)	(0.035)			
TSpoor	0.063***	0.070*	0.081**	0.048			
	(0.022)	(0.039)	(0.036)	(0.037)			
TSind	0.050**	0.051	0.070*	0.024			
	(0.021)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.035)			
protest_exp	0.150***	0.103***	0.138***	0.163***	0.149***	0.137***	0.136***
	(0.010)	(0.019)	(0.016)	(0.015)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.010)
hijes	−0.073***	0.000	−0.072**	−0.107***	−0.073***	−0.061***	−0.063***
	(0.020)	(0.037)	(0.035)	(0.026)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.019)
T2					0.027***	0.054*	0.080
					(0.009)	(0.028)	(0.059)
linkfate						0.254***	−0.003
						(0.057)	(0.280)
T2:linkfate						−0.038	−0.139
						(0.038)	(0.188)
linkfate^2							0.203
							(0.211)
T2:linkfate^2							0.082
							(0.141)
R^2	0.198	0.081	0.220	0.272	0.198	0.227	0.234
Adj. R^2	0.195	0.069	0.209	0.262	0.195	0.224	0.229
Num. obs.	1145	422	354	369	1145	1145	1145
RMSE	0.263	0.282	0.239	0.243	0.263	0.259	0.258

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Table 35: Re-estimation of main model for full sample with multiple comparison correction adjusted p-values
Methods used: (a) Bonferroni, (b) Holm, (c) Benjamini & Hochberg

		Support	Participation	Protest	Index
TEnc	coeff.	0.552	0.316	0.418	0.043
	original p-value	0.018**	0.215	0.102	0.048**
	Bonferroni	0.055*	0.646	0.305	0.145
	Holm	0.022**	0.431	0.102	0.048**
	BH	0.018**	0.257	0.018	0.048**
TSpoor	coeff.	0.624	0.549	0.728	0.063
	original p-value	0.007***	0.034**	0.005***	0.004***
	Bonferroni	0.021**	0.102	0.016**	0.013**
	Holm	0.021**	0.102	0.016**	0.013**
	BH	0.016**	0.102	0.016**	0.013**
TSind	coeff.	0.601	0.285	0.619	0.050
	original p-value	0.011**	0.257	0.015**	0.019**
	Bonferroni	0.032**	0.771	0.046**	0.057*
	Holm	0.022**	0.431	0.031**	0.038**
	BH	0.016**	0.257	0.016**	0.029**
R^2		0.11	0.18	0.20	0.20
Adj. R^2		0.10	0.18	0.19	0.19
Num. obs.		1145	1145	1145	1145
Imbalanced covariates		✓	✓	✓	✓
Balanced covariates		×	×	×	×

$^{***}p < 0.01$; $^{**}p < 0.05$; $^{*}p < 0.1$

Figure 21: Balance across treatment arms: Mean ideology (left) and level of gender linked fate (right)